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CURING THE AU THORLESS VOID: 
PROTECTING COMPU TER-GENERATED WORKS 
FOLLOWING ICET V  AND PHONE DIRECTORIES  
J A N I  M CCU T C H E O N *  
This article builds on the author’s recent article ‘The Vanishing Author in Computer-
Generated Works: A Critical Analysis of Recent Australian Case Law’. That article ex-
plained how recent Australian case law has seriously undermined copyright protection for 
works which are substantially shaped by software such that they lack a human author. 
The article argued that such works, if otherwise original, should not be denied copyright 
protection solely because they are computer-generated. This article thoroughly examines 
and evaluates three possible reform options: (1) deeming authorship of computer-
generated works; (2) classifying computer-generated materials as subject matter other 
than works; and (3) sui generis protection. This article will also explore the sometimes 
difficult issues these options generate. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N   
In an earlier article (hereafter, ‘Part 1’)1 the author discussed how IceTV Pty 
Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd (‘IceTV ’),2 Telstra Corporation Limited v 
Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd (‘Phone Directories’)3 and Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp 
Pty Ltd (‘Acohs’)4 seriously diminish, if not eliminate, copyright protection in 
computer-generated material (‘CGM’) which is substantially shaped by soft-
ware. IceTV warned of ‘new challenges in relation to the paradigm of an indi-
vidual author’5 which particularly affect computer-generated productions 
such as large, complex databases and compilations, multi-authored produc-
tions, autonomously generated art and literature, and productions where it is 
practically impossible to identify the human authors. 
Part 1 argued that where CGM would, but for its authorless status, be a 
copyright work, then copyright protection was necessary, consistent with cop-
yright policy, and realistic in the computer age. Three possible reforms to ad-
dress the lacuna in protection for such computer-generated works were very 
briefly outlined in Part 1, namely (1) protection of computer-generated works 
in Part III of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (‘the Act’) through an authorial 
deeming provision; (2) protection of computer-generated ‘material’ in Part IV 
of the Act as a new protected ‘subject matter’; and (3) completely novel sui 
generis legislation. This article explores those three possible reforms. Each 
option is described in detail, the sometimes difficult questions generated by 
each option are addressed, and responses to those questions explored. 
 
 1 Jani McCutcheon, ‘The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works: A Critical Analysis 
of Recent Australian Case Law’ (2012) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 917. 
 2 (2009) 239 CLR 458. 
 3 (2010) 264 ALR 617, affd (2010) 194 FCR 142 (‘Phone Directories (Appeal)’). 
 4 (2010) 86 IPR 492, affd (2012) 201 FCR 173. 
 5 (2009) 239 CLR 458, 470 [23] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
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II   P O S S I B L E  R E F O R M S 
The case law discussed in Part 1 highlights manifold problems relating to ab-
sent, multiple and asynchronous authorship in relation to CGM. The same 
case law also radically narrows the originality standard for compilations.6 The 
possible range of CGM is almost limitless, making reform to protect it prob-
lematic. Part 1 concentrated on CGM which, had it been authored, would 
have been a protected copyright work (hereafter ‘otherwise original works’). 
Reform proposals which also protect unoriginal CGM generate more contro-
versial issues, particularly where the social and economic costs of protection 
outweigh the benefits. The proposed reforms also need to be critiqued against 
the policy objectives of copyright law explored in Part 1, and incidental issues 
such as duration of protection and copyright ownership must be addressed. 
The diverse issues at play mean that a holistic approach involving a suite of 
reforms may be necessary. 
The following reform options are explored in this article: 
1 Retain computer-generated works in Part III of the Act as ‘works’, and fic-
tionalise an author through a deeming provision. Complementary reforms 
include defining a ‘computer-generated work’ and amending the definition 
of a ‘work of joint authorship’ to accommodate multi-authored computer-
generated works. 
2 Protect CGM in Part IV of the Act as authorless ‘subject matter’. Comple-
mentary reforms include defining ‘computer-generated material’ and de-
fining its maker. 
3 Introduce sui generis protection, possibly using the European Database 
Directive7 as a model. 
It is clear that other de facto methods of protection are available to the 
producer of CGM, including controls effected through contract, technological 
locks, actions for breach of confidence, and even miscellaneous civil and 
criminal provisions regulating conduct in relation to computers. However, as 
 
 6 Discussed further in Jani McCutcheon, ‘When Sweat Turns to Ice: The Originality Threshold 
for Compilations following IceTV and Phone Directories’ (2011) 22 Australian Intellectual 
Property Journal 87; Mark Davison, ‘Copyright Protection for Compilations: Australia Does a 
U-Turn’ (2010) 32 European Intellectual Property Review 457. 
 7 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
Legal Protection of Databases [1996] OJ L 77/20. 
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none of these methods is a sufficiently comprehensive solution8 to the prob-
lems identified in Part 1, they are not pursued. 
III   O P T IO N  1:  DE E M I N G  A U T H O R S H I P  O F   
CO M P U T E R-G E N E R AT E D  WO R K S   
In the absence of an author in fact, a legislatively deemed author seems a prac-
tical solution. The Copyright Law Review Committee (‘CLRC’) has recom-
mended this course of action.9 Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in IceTV 
made pointed reference to the lack of a deeming provision equivalent to  
s 9(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48 (‘UK Act’),10  
which provides: 
In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-
generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrange-
ments necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken. 
A number of other jurisdictions have adopted a virtually identical authorial 
deeming provision in relation to computer-generated works.11 Section 178 of 
the UK Act provides that: 
 
 8 See, eg, Daniel J Gervais, ‘The Protection of Databases’ (2007) 82 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
1109, 1111; Mark J Davison and P Bernt Hugenholtz, ‘Football Fixtures, Horseraces and 
Spin-Offs: The ECJ Domesticates the Database Right’ (2005) 27 European Intellectual Proper-
ty Review 113; Edward Thompson, ‘Should Australia Adopt a Sui Generis Right for Non-
Original Databases?’ (2011) 29 Copyright Reporter 71. 
 9 The CLRC first recommended the adoption of a deeming provision identical to s 9(3) of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48 in its draft report: CLRC, Parliament of 
Australia, Draft Report on Computer Software Protection (1993) 244–5 [13.08] (‘Draft Re-
port’), cited in the Committee’s final report: CLRC, Parliament of Australia, Computer Soft-
ware Protection (1995) [13.18] (‘Computer Software Protection Report’). Note also that in a 
later report the CLRC determined that a requirement of human authorship should be re-
placed with a consideration of the more ‘germane issue’ of ‘which human should be the one 
identified as sufficiently associated with the creation or production of the material’: CLRC, 
Parliament of Australia, Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968 Part 2: Categorisation of Sub-
ject Matter and Exclusive Rights, and Other Issues (1999) 58 [5.45] (‘Simplification of the Copy-
right Act Report’). The report further stated, ‘[t]he concept of a human who “undertakes the 
creation or production of ” copyright material has a degree of similarity to the deemed author 
of a “computer-generated work”, as provided in the UK copyright legislation’: at 58 [5.46]. 
 10 (2009) 239 CLR 458, 494 [98]. 
 11 Provisions identical to s 9(3) of the UK Act are found in Copyright Ordinance (Hong Kong) 
cap 528, s 11(3); Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (NI) s 21(f); Copyright Act 1994 (NZ) 
s 5(2); Copyright Act 1978 (South Africa) s 1(1) (definition of ‘author’). A similar provision is 
found in the Copyright Act 1957 (India) s 2(d)(vi), which provides that ‘author means … in 
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‘computer-generated’, in relation to a work, means that the work is generated by 
computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work.12  
The provision thus fictionalises an author for the purposes of conferring  
protection. 
Given the adoption of this approach in numerous common law jurisdic-
tions and its apparent capacity to ameliorate the problems exposed in Part 1, a 
close scrutiny of this model, and the many questions it raises, follows. The 
model enacted in the UK will be critiqued. 
A  The Originality–Authorship Corollary 
It is worth noting that an authorial deeming provision will not convert an 
unoriginal work into an original one. The remaining copyright subsistence 
criteria must be satisfied; in particular the work must be original.13 However, 
the provision is interesting in that the primary marker of originality — the 
author — is necessarily absent, or at least impossible to identify. Thus it seems 
the criterion of originality would be applied on a hypothetical basis: if the 
work had been authored by a human, or if that human could be identified, 
would it be original? 
B  Definition of ‘Computer-Generated Work’ 
The first question is whether the work meets the definition of ‘computer-
generated’, which depends not on a mere difficulty in identifying an author 
(perhaps among many candidates), but on there being no human author.14 
This ostensibly mandates an enquiry which exhausts the possibility of an au-
thor. Such an enquiry could require considerable debate and potentially copi-
ous evidence relating to the methods of production, the nature of the soft-
ware, and the roles of the human participants.15 Whether there is a human 
author of CGM is the very question explored extensively in Part 1, and, as 
 
relation to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the 
person who causes the work to be created’. 
 12 Note that s 2 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (NI) defines ‘computer-generated’, 
in relation to a work, as that which is ‘generated by computer in circumstances where the au-
thor of the work is not an individual’. 
 13 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 32. 
 14 Ibid s 178. 
 15 See, eg, the evidence and its thorough examination by Gordon J in Phone Directories (2010) 
264 ALR 617 relating to the creation of the telephone directories. 
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demonstrated in Part 1, is difficult to answer given the broad scope of CGM. 
A deeming provision may not avoid argument on this primary and difficult 
issue of fact, which reduces its efficacy.16 
Further, the difficulty with much of CGM is a lack of evidence of author-
ship, rather than a lack of authorship. For example, it was suggested in Part 1 
that the ultimate designers of the compilations in Phone Directories may have 
been authors. These persons may have been overlooked not because they did 
not exist, but because they could not be identified. Therefore a computer-
generated work should be defined as a work lacking an ‘identifiable human 
author’.17 The deeming provision would then apply where the sheer complexi-
ty of the work and/or evidentiary gaps make determining human authorship 
simply too difficult or indeed impossible.18  
In practice, argument on this definitional point is only likely to be robust 
where copyright ownership depends on the answer.19 Where ownership does 
not turn on the issue, argument is likely to be avoided. This is because there 
 
 16 This was recognised by the CLRC in the Simplification of the Copyright Act Report, above n 9, 
59 [5.47]:  
the types and degree of computer involvement in the creation of copyright material are so 
varied, that an approach that distinguishes between material created ‘with the assistance 
of ’ a computer and material created ‘by’ a computer is likely to prove difficult to under-
stand and apply in practice. The majority of the Committee instead prefers the envisaged 
approach described herein [the relevant person being the person ‘undertaking the crea-
tion or production of ’ the copyright material], since this avoids the need to identify 
which types of subject matter are ‘computer-generated’ — a task that might require com-
plex distinctions to be drawn between computer-generated, computer-assisted and other 
degrees of computer-mediated involvement in the making of copyright subject matter. 
 17 Some support for this is found in the CLRC’s Computer Software Protection Report, above n 9, 
[13.15]: ‘As already noted, one of the features of computer-generated material is that it has no 
identifiable human author’ (emphasis added). 
 18 Ibid [13.11], where computer-generation was described as ‘the circumstance where it is diffi-
cult, or not possible, to say that the computer output is the result of the labour of an individ-
ual or individuals’. 
 19 Once the deemed author is identified, he or she would ordinarily be the copyright owner 
(Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 35(2)) unless an exception applies (in most cases, the employee 
exception in s 35(6)). This would bring the ordinary problems of ownership as well. Thus, if 
the person making the arrangements was a third party contractor, he or she would still be 
deemed the author and thus ostensibly the owner, in the absence of alternative contractual 
arrangements. The definition may also be debated if a connecting factor turns on its interpre-
tation. However, the reciprocal protection provisions of the Berne Convention make this a less 
pressing issue: Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for 
signature 14 July 1967, 828 UNTS 222 (entered into force 29 January 1970). 
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will either be a natural author, or a deemed20 author.21 Since in either case 
there will be an author, there seems little point arguing about whether the 
degree of human mental effort was sufficient to confer authorship. 
C  Who ‘Undertakes the Arrangements Necessary’  
for the Creation of the Work?  
The critical and difficult task, in the various scenarios discussed in Part 1, is 
identifying the person who ‘undertakes the arrangements necessary’22 for the 
creation of the work (hereafter ‘relevant person’). That person will be the 
deemed author (and very often the copyright owner). 
One preliminary question requires discussion. Can the relevant person be 
a corporation? While the UK Act contemplates non-human authorship,23 the 
Act would require amendment to facilitate this. While for the purposes of 
Part IV subject matter, a ‘qualified person’ may be a corporation,24 other pro-
visions of the Act strongly imply that the author of a work must be human.25 
While corporate authorship may have advantages in this model, discussed 
further below, it would require a broader suite of amendments to the Act. 
The deeming provision requires reflection on the ‘arrangements’ involved 
in the creation of a computer-generated work, and whether they are ‘neces-
sary’ to its creation. ‘Arrangements’ are preparations,26 requiring necessary 
organisation so that something else can happen. ‘Necessary’ suggests the ar-
 
 20 There may then be robust argument as to who the deemed author is, discussed below, partic-
ularly if it means the claimant is not the copyright owner. 
 21 See, as an example from South Africa: Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 
(2006) 4 SA 458, 471 [31] (Streicher JA) (Supreme Court of Appeal): ‘a work qualifies as hav-
ing been computer-generated if it was created by a computer in circumstances where there is 
no human author of the work. If there is a human author, the work is computer assisted and 
not computer-generated.’ 
 22 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 9(3). 
 23 Ibid s 154(1)(c). As does the United States ‘work for hire’ doctrine. The work for hire doc-
trine provides that copyright in a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or 
her employment or a work specially ordered or commissioned for certain defined uses is 
owned by the employer or commissioner. See the definition of a ‘work made for hire’ in Cop-
yrights, 17 USC §101 (2012). See also the clarification that ownership of the copyright work 
resides with the employer/commissioner: Copyrights, 17 USC §201(b) (2013). 
 24 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 84 (definition of ‘Qualified Person’). 
 25 Ibid s 32(4). The duration provisions also rely on the life of an author, discussed further be-
low. 
 26 Susan Butler (ed), Macquarie Dictionary (5th ed, 2009) 58. 
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rangements cannot be dispensed with.27 Since computer-generated works are 
not homogeneous, each inquiry will unavoidably be fact-specific. However, 
the possible candidates include the person: 
a) commanding the software to run; 
b) instructing or training that person; 
c) designing the desired form of the output; 
d) selecting or customising the software to fulfil their or another’s design; 
e) intending to create the work; 
f) arranging any of the above conduct by others; 
g) who owns the computer systems, and/or who owns the software; 
h) investing in the creation of the work (who may also be the person or per-
sons in any of a–g above); 
i) who writes the software (who may also be the person or persons in any of 
a–h above); and 
j) who is a combination of any of these persons. 
Arguably, each of these candidates makes arrangements, in the sense of mak-
ing preparations, or organising, and each arrangement is causally necessary 
because the work would not be created without it. Similar candidates were 
contemplated in the Draft Report on Computer Software Protection of  
the CLRC.28  
The deeming provision assumes there is no ‘authorial’ effort in computer-
generation which deserves acknowledgement. Therefore, its rationale is more 
about conferring copyright ownership on or through the relevant person. 
Thus in practice, nominating the relevant person from a competing field will 
be less important where all candidates make arrangements as employees of 
the same employer,29 or where they have assigned copyright to the same per-
 
 27 Ibid 837. 
 28 These were ‘(a) the programmer or owner of the copyright in the programs that assisted in 
creation of the work; (b) the provider of the data; (c) the user of the computer/computer pro-
gram; or (d) the investor or owner of the computer/computer program’: CLRC, Draft Report, 
above n 9, 243 [13.04] cited in CLRC, Computer Software Protection Report, above n 9, 
[13.19]. 
 29 This is since s 35(6) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) provides that ownership would vest in 
the author’s employer in that case. 
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son. As mentioned above, the identity of the deemed author will be contested 
strenuously where ownership turns on the issue. 
The following factors appear relevant when classifying the arrangements, 
the importance and relative weight of which may vary depending on the type 
of work created:30 
1 Intention to create the work. This involves asking who wanted the work — 
who instigated the work with the intention of creating it? 
2 Proximity to the act of final creation. This involves asking when the ar-
rangements occur in the chain of creation. It is suggested that acts that are 
distant from the final materialisation are less likely to be sufficiently pre-
liminary arrangements. This would most likely exclude programmers as 
appropriate candidates.31 The act of programming may occur many years 
before the work employing the software is created. Mere programmers lack 
sufficiently direct intention to create the work. They know their software 
will produce a work, but that is significantly different to intending to pro-
duce it. Insofar as copyright is conferred as an incentive to create, the re-
ward for programmers should be for the software, not the works derived 
from it. Indeed, ordinarily, the author of a derivative work will obtain cop-
yright in the work, the source work author perhaps having a claim for cop-
yright infringement but not an ownership or authorship claim in the in-
fringing work. If deemed to be an author, programmers may also then be 
the owner, which may be inequitable since they have already been reward-
ed (or may have freely licensed the software). The likely exclusion of the 
programmer from consideration as the most suitable candidate is also con-
sistent with existing jurisprudence denying the programmer natural au-
thorship of the output.32 
 
 30 For example, an investment criterion may be far more relevant to the production of satellite-
generated photographs of the Earth, whereas more ‘creative’ arrangements impacting the 
shape of the work will be more relevant to computer-generated art. 
 31 At the very least, it would exclude those whose sole contribution is as programmer of the 
software. For example, if the programmer was also another candidate, he or she retains rele-
vancy in that capacity. 
 32 In Acohs (2010) 86 IPR 492, 512–13 [53], Jessup J rejected the argument that the authors of 
the generated code were the programmers who wrote the software which caused its genera-
tion, since they understood what the source code would look like, stating: 
it would be artificial to regard the programmers as involved in the task of writing the 
source code for thousands of [safety data sheets] yet to take a material form merely be-
cause they wrote, and amended, the program which, when prompted, would put together 
 
56 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 37:46 
3 The extent to which the arrangements shape the form of the work (design 
input). These arrangements, being directed to the particular material ex-
pression of the work, are more authorial. If a person shaping the form of 
the output has been identified, then the deeming provision would not ap-
ply since that person would be the author. Further, conduct which shapes 
the material form of a work is less likely to be an ‘arrangement’ preparatory 
to the act of creation, and more likely to be an act of creation itself. Thus, 
these candidates are more likely to be either excluded or at least subordi-
nated to other candidates. However, the person selecting the software that 
shapes the ultimate form of the work may be considered a candidate. 
4 The extent to which the arrangements are responsible for the materialisa-
tion of the work. This includes users and those who are commanded to op-
erate the software. Commencing and prosecuting the automation process 
is a direct and highly relevant arrangement, clearly necessary to the crea-
tion of the work, and is consistent with the importance of the conventional 
author’s role as material fixer. However, this type of scenario could award 
authorship (and thus potentially ownership) to a mere ‘button pusher’. It 
may also be incongruous to reward the fixer when the deeming provision 
focuses on arrangements necessary for the fixation. In other words, the ac-
tual creation and the arrangements preparatory to it are different conduct, 
though clearly both part of the process leading to the final creation. 
5 Investment. This asks who paid for the work. Given that authorship gener-
ally leads to ownership, the criterion of investment in the work should be 
critical. It seems equitable to allocate authorship to the person paying for 
the work.33 This may also be most consistent with the policy objectives for 
conferring copyright, discussed in Part 1, since that person is, practically, 
the one who provides the social and other benefits of the work. This ap-
proach concentrates on investment in the work, which would exclude con-
sideration of the investment by the software author where that author did 
not employ the software to produce the actual work. 
 
a selection of the fragments of source code which they did write with other fragments lat-
er contributed by the authors. 
 33 See Slater v Wimmer [2012] EWPCC 7 (16 February 2012) [15] (Judge Birss) for a discussion 
of almost identical wording in the UK Act, in the context of a dispute relating to film copy-
right: ‘In practice the English rules of equity are also important’. In that case, discussed fur-
ther below, person A agreed to pay the expenses of person B to come on an adventure trip if 
in return person B shot the film footage of the trip. 
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D  Analogous Guidance from Film and Sound Recording Authorship 
Virtually identical wording to the UK deeming provision has been used to 
determine ownership and authorship in films34 and sound recordings, and it 
therefore seems pertinent to examine how that phrase has been interpreted in 
those contexts. 
1 Interpretation of the Phrase in Australia 
In Australia, films are subject matter other than works and thus are not au-
thored.35 The ‘maker’ of a film ‘is the person by whom the arrangements nec-
essary for the making of the film were undertaken’.36 A film is made when 
things are done which are necessary for the production of the first copy of  
the film.37 
The reasoning of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Seven Network 
(Operations) Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd, broadly followed Lahore’s ar-
gument that the relevant person is ‘generally the producer who makes the 
financial or administrative arrangements for the production of the first copy 
of the film’.38 Ricketson and Creswell regard the definition as ‘more open-
ended’, noting that the arrangements ‘could include the business and financial 
arrangements that are necessary for the production of the first copy as much 
as the actual physical acts involved in its making, such as the direction, shoot-
ing and editing’.39 However, they concede that ‘[i]n film industry practice,  
 
 34 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 22(4)(b); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, 
s 9(2)(ab). 
 35 Unlike in the UK, where no distinction is made between works and other subject matter: 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, ss 1, 5B, 9(2)(ab). Similarly, in the US 
‘motion pictures’ are ‘works of authorship’: Copyrights, 17 USC § 102 (1976). 
 36 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 22(4)(b). 
 37 Ibid s 22(4)(a). 
 38 See Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2005) 146 FCR 183, 186–8 
[12]–[19] (Lindgren J) citing James Lahore, Copyright and Designs (Butterworths, 3rd ed, 
1996) [20,145]. See also Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2005) 
146 FCR 183, 200 [89] (Finkelstein J), 208–10 [113]–[121] (Edmonds J in dissent). This ap-
proach was followed in Wills v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [No 3] (2010) IPR 252, 
258 [29], [31] (Gilmour J). However, Gilmour J notes that s 98(4) of the Act appears to allow 
for the possibility of there being multiple ‘makers’ of a film, through its reference to ‘each di-
rector’: at 258 [28]. 
 39 Staniforth Ricketson and Christopher Creswell, The Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, 
Designs and Confidential Information (at Update 65) [5.45]. 
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this would mean the producer of the film, rather than the camera operator  
or director.’40 
While these brief statements fail to acknowledge that some principal pro-
ducers41 perform more creative roles,42 Lahore’s definition focuses on the 
business or administrative function of the producer, and thus the relevant 
person is more likely to be (or at least to include) the ‘business’ producer who 
raises the money and organises most aspects of the actual making of the film. 
Reflecting a policy of rewarding the investor, the copyright in a commis-
sioned film is owned by the commissioner, irrespective of who made it,43 and 
an employer owns the copyright in any film made by an employee director.44  
2 Interpretation of the Phrase in the United Kingdom 
An identical definition has been utilised in the UK Act. Since December 1996, 
the film’s producer and the principal director are together deemed an author.45 
 
 40 Ibid. 
 41 A host of subordinate producers may fill the credits of many movies — executive producers, 
line producers, co-producers, and assistant producers, however, it is likely the principal pro-
ducer will be the one who really gets the film made. 
 42 The lead producer may be a ‘business’ or a ‘creative’ producer, see Rick Schwartz, ‘What Do 
Movie Producers Do? A Movie Producer Explains’ on Grantland (3 November 2011) 
<http://www.grantland.com/blog/hollywood-prospectus/print?id=36634>: 
The former either finds the money or is able to navigate the tricky ins and outs of movie 
accounting, whether it’s in conjunction with a studio or with an independent company. 
The latter works closely with the director on the script, casting, editing and music in the 
film. 
 43 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 98(3). Thus, where the fact of commissioning can be established, 
the maker of the film has no claim to copyright. 
 44 Ibid s 98(5). In narrow circumstances, a director may be a maker of a film together with the 
maker as defined in s 22(4)(b). The film must be non-commissioned, and the director must 
not make the film as an employee (ss 98(4)–(5)), as introduced by the Copyright Amendment 
(Film Directors’ Rights) Act 2005 (Cth). However, the copyright is very limited. The director 
(or the director’s employer) becomes the owner of the copyright only so far as the copyright 
consists of the right to include the film in a retransmission of a free to air broadcast: Copy-
right Act 1968 (Cth) s 98(6). 
 45 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 9(2)(ab). Prior to that, s 9(2)(a) of the 
UK Act provided that the author of a film is ‘the person by whom the arrangements neces-
sary for the making of the … film are undertaken’. Section 13(10) of the Copyright Act 1956 
(UK) c 74 was the same provision. The change mandating co-authorship between the pro-
ducer and director was introduced in response to a Directive of the European Parliament and 
Council on the harmonisation of the term of copyright protection of, inter alia, literary and 
artistic works under the Berne Convention, as the life of the author plus 70 years: Council Di-
rective 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and 
Certain Related Rights [1993] OJ L 290/9. Article 2(1) provides that ‘the principal director of 
a cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be considered as its author or one of its authors’ 
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While ‘director’ is not defined, ‘producer’ is defined as ‘the person by whom 
the arrangements necessary for the making of the sound recording or film are 
undertaken’.46 Prior to December 1996, the UK Act reflected the Australian 
position, and the ‘maker’ of a film was defined as the relevant person. The fact 
that the UK Act expressly defines the ‘producer’ as the relevant person clearly 
strengthens the interpretation adopted in the Australia context. 
In Re FG (Films) Ltd, Vaisey J held that the definition of the relevant per-
son47 was ‘perhaps a strange collocation of words which might in other cir-
cumstances give rise to some difficulty of interpretation’, but that 
‘“[u]ndertake” means … “be responsible for,” especially in the financial sense, 
but also generally.’48 His Honour held that the applicants acted merely as the 
nominee of, and agent for, another company which ‘financed the making of 
the film’49 thus were not the makers. 
Adventure Film Productions SA v Tully 50 was an interlocutory motion for 
delivery up of a film, pending trial of a dispute as to who was the ‘maker’ of 
the film. The case was decided under the Copyright Act 1956 (UK) c 74, 
s 13(10) of which provided that the relevant person was the maker of a film. 
Directors of the plaintiff, who at the time included the defendant Mr Tully, 
conceived the idea for the film and Channel 4 provided the funding to the 
plaintiff, although the agreement between Channel 4 and the plaintiff gave 
copyright to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then bore the expenses of the project 
and organised it. Mr Tully assisted with the project but he then fell out with 
his co-director. He later claimed he was also a maker because he filmed the 
footage. Noting that the expenses had been borne by the plaintiff and it had 
(through its officers) organised the production of the film, Whitford J held 
that the plaintiff had strong prospects of success at trial and said of the defini-
tion of maker: 
 
(emphasis added), thus mandating directors as authors but leaving some latitude to deter-
mine co-authors. 
 46 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 178. 
 47 The applicants needed to establish that they were the sole maker of a film, who was defined as 
the relevant person in s 44 of the Cinematograph Films Act 1938 (UK) c 17. 
 48 [1953] 1 WLR 483, 485. 
 49 Ibid 486. 
 50 [1993] EMLR 376. 
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it seems to me quite plain that it was not intended that the person who ‘turned 
the handle’, as it would have been at one time, nowadays I suppose ‘presses the 
button’, is to be regarded as being the maker of the film.51 
Beggars Banquet Records Ltd v Carlton Television Ltd (‘Beggars Banquet’)52 
also concerned an interlocutory motion for delivery of a film pending trial of 
a dispute as to who the ‘maker’ was. The plaintiff was a record company which 
commissioned the second defendant to make a video about a ‘rave’.53 Warner J 
found the two preceding cases of little guidance, being confined to their facts. 
His Honour accepted ‘that the arrangements necessary for the making of a 
film include the provision of finance for its production’,54 but clarified that the 
relevant person is ‘the person who is directly responsible for paying the pro-
duction costs rather than the person, who could be a bank, from whom the 
person so responsible obtains the money’,55 or a commissioner of a film.56 
Warner J attached less importance to arrangements gaining access to loca-
tions, or the filming per se where that was a commissioned task.57 However, 
he suggested that the second defendant was probably a joint owner of the 
copyright with the plaintiff.58 
Mad Hat Music Ltd v Pulse 8 Records Ltd 59 was an interlocutory applica-
tion concerning a dispute between a singer’s manager and a record company. 
Both claimed copyright in the sound recordings of the singer’s performances. 
As with films, the UK Act deemed the author of a sound recording to be the 
relevant person. The manager’s claim to authorship rested on simply making 
the singer available for recording sessions. Mervyn Davies J did not rate the 
manager’s prospects of success highly, but permitted the case to go to trial as 
there was a serious question to be tried. 
In Century Communications Ltd v Mayfair Entertainment UK Ltd,60 Era 
Communications produced a film on the Chinese mainland, which required 
 
 51 Ibid 379. 
 52 [1993] EMLR 349. 
 53 Note that the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48 does not grant copyright in a 
film to the commissioner of the film. 
 54 Beggars Banquet [1993] EMLR 349, 361. 
 55 Ibid. 
 56 Ibid 361–2. 
 57 Ibid 362. 
 58 Ibid 363. 
 59 [1993] EMLR 172. 
 60 [1993] EMLR 335. 
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the assistance of Century in obtaining the permissions and shooting the film. 
Sir Mervyn Davies held: 
it is plain to me that the arrangements necessary for the making of the film 
were undertaken by Era Communications. There would never have been a film 
had Era Communications not initiated its making and organised the activity 
necessary for its making and paid for it. To achieve that purpose they had to in-
voke the help of CCP and that Era Communications did. CCP made no ar-
rangements. They simply helped Era Communications to make the film.61 
In A & M Records Ltd v Video Collection International Ltd 62 the dispute 
concerned ownership of copyright in a sound recording of musical arrange-
ments required for performances by celebrity ice-skaters, Torvill and Dean. 
The two possible relevant persons were Mr Ross (a conductor) and Mr Pullen 
(Torvill and Dean’s agent). Pullen and Ross agreed that Ross would set up a 
studio and musicians at Ross’s expense in return for a fee that would enable 
Ross to make a profit. Ross commissioned and paid for the musical arrange-
ments; booked and paid for the recording studio; arranged, engaged and paid 
for 51 musicians, a sound engineer and a fixer; and paid all the expenses. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Sir Mervyn Davies held that Ross was not the person 
who undertook the arrangements necessary for the making of the recording, 
but rather Pullen was. Although the ‘making of the recording’ was the work of 
Ross, the question is ‘who undertook the arrangements necessary for that 
making’,63 and that was Pullen: 
Having been told by Torvill and Dean what they wanted, [Pullen] set about 
seeking a musician who was suitable for the task of making sound recordings 
suitable for use at the skating championships. He found Mr Ross. He made an 
agreement with him that Mr Ross would set up a studio and musicians at his 
(Mr Ross’s) expense in return for a fee that would enable Mr Ross to make a 
profit for himself. It was known that the recordings proposed would be used 
not only at the skating championship but also in the course of compiling a CD 
for sale to the public.64 
In granting sole copyright to Pullen, the decision is surprising because it 
appears contrary to Warner J’s clarification in Beggars Banquet that the rele-
 
 61 Ibid 342. 
 62 [1995] EMLR 25. 
 63 Ibid 32 (Sir Mervyn Davies). 
 64 Ibid. 
62 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 37:46 
vant person is ‘the person who is directly responsible for paying the produc-
tion costs rather than the person … from whom the person so responsible 
obtains the money’,65 or a commissioner. In Beggars Banquet, Warner J fore-
shadowed that the commissioned film maker could be a joint author of the 
film.66 On the same basis, Ross should at least have a claim to joint authorship 
as producer, particularly since the financial risk was born by him. 
Bamgboye v Reed 67 applied the current provisions of the UK Act in the 
context of a sound recording. The UK Act now defines the creator and author 
of a sound recording to be the producer,68 namely the relevant person. The 
sound recording in this case was made by making a copy of an existing re-
cording of a song. Mr Reed decided that further editing, recording and mas-
tering of the recording were necessary, although Mr Bamgboye considered it 
finished. The additional work took place at Bamgboye’s parents’ home. Reed 
supplied a tape of the song and a machine to play its major musical compo-
nent. Bamgboye made a copy of the original tape on his parents’ computer in 
their home, which he then edited and mastered. Judge Williamson referred to 
‘various authorities’ (clearly including Re FG (Films) Ltd) which showed ‘in 
particular, that “undertaking these arrangements” effectively means to be re-
sponsible for producing the sound recording in the financial sense or general-
ly.’69 Given that this was a casual method of production with no ‘financial ar-
rangements’,70 the real question was ‘who instigated the relevant recording 
and organised the activity necessary for its making?’71 Judge Williamson 
clearly found it difficult to apply the definition, but in the end she held that 
Reed was the relevant person. He was ‘the moving force’72 and the recording 
would not have been made without his instigation.73 The arrangements con-
tributed by Bamgboye were ‘subsidiary’74 and more of an artistic nature.75 
Importantly, Judge Williamson warned against the temptation to ‘look at the 
 
 65 [1993] EMLR 349, 361. 
 66 Ibid 361–2. 
 67 [2004] EMLR 5. 
 68 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 178. See also ss 9(1)–(2). 
 69 Bamgboye v Reed [2004] EMLR 5, 75 [47]. 
 70 Ibid 86 [86]. 
 71 Ibid. 
 72 Ibid 87 [86]. 
 73 Ibid 86 [86]. 
 74 Ibid 87 [87]. 
 75 Ibid. 
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separate parts of what was done and simply say there were jointly contributa-
ble arrangements.’76 She considered that the real question was whether  
this recording would have happened if Bamgboye had not been involved, and 
my answer to that is that it would have happened somehow … On the other 
hand, would it have happened without Reed’s involvement? The answer is 
“no”.77  
The recent case of Slater v Wimmer78 concerned a dispute about the own-
ership of copyright in film footage of a skydive over Mount Everest. Mr Slater 
shot the footage in question and Mr Wimmer was one of the skydivers and 
paid for the trip including Mr Slater’s costs. Both claimed copyright in the 
film. After considering the existing case law, Judge Birss held that the follow-
ing principles apply: 
The definition does not simply refer to the person who made the film, it focuses 
on the person undertaking the necessary arrangements for doing so. … On the 
other hand one cannot go too far up the chain and away from the film making 
arrangements. The bank is not the person undertaking the necessary arrange-
ments even if the money all came from a bank.79 
Judge Birss held that it was wrong to say Slater was the person by whom 
the arrangements necessary for the making of the film were undertaken simp-
ly because he shot the footage.80 Slater’s filming only happened because 
Wimmer decided to undertake the project and arrange for it to be filmed. 
Wimmer did not just pay for the event, he also paid costs associated with 
making the film such as paying (at least most of) Slater’s travelling expenses. 
But Wimmer was not merely the banker, the project was his project. The end 
result under the post-1996 provisions was that, as the principal director, Slater 
was deemed joint author with Wimmer as producer.81  
The UK authorities indicate that determining the relevant person will al-
ways be highly fact sensitive.82 However, some important factors in identify-
ing the relevant person appear to be: 
 
 76 Ibid 87 [88]. 
 77 Ibid. 
 78 [2012] EWPCC 7 (16 February 2012). 
 79 Ibid [80]. 
 80 Ibid [85]. 
 81 Ibid [86]. 
 82 Beggars Banquet [1993] EMLR 349. 
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a) who instigated the making of the film83 — who intended to create the film? 
This appears more important when no money was expended; 
b) who paid for the making of the film, but not merely as a ‘bank’.84 The key 
factor is financial responsibility for the film;85 
c) whether there would have been a film but for the instigation and conduct 
of the relevant person;86 
d) that more than one person may be the relevant person;87 and 
e) that more ‘creative’ contributions are less relevant.88 
3 Analogising the Definition to Computer-Generated Works 
The arrangements leading to the creation of a film or sound recording may of 
course be quite different to those leading to the creation of a computer-
generated work.89 However, particularly where numerous individuals create 
the computer-generated work, an overall organiser of those individuals as-
sumes similar roles to a producer. Further, the broader criteria identified by 
the UK courts applicable to films and sound recordings are equally applicable 
to computer-generated works in any context, such as who instigated the crea-
tion of the work, who paid for it, and would it have been made but for the 
putative relevant person? Both the UK and Australian authorities also direct 
attention away from more ‘creative’ input, which accords with the UK Act’s 
s 9(3) definition of ‘computer-generated work’ as a work without an author. 
They also regard as less relevant the mere materialisation of the film or re-
cording, which is also consistent with a definition focusing on arrangements 
preparatory to the actual making of the work. Therefore, the interpretation of 
 
 83 Bamgboye v Reed [2004] EMLR 5, 86 [86] (Judge Williamson). 
 84 Slater v Wimmer [2012] EWPCC 7 (16 February 2012); Beggars Banquet [1993] EMLR 349. 
 85 Beggars Banquet [1993] EMLR 349. 
 86 Century Communications [1993] EMLR 335; Bamgboye v Reed [2004] EMLR 5, 87 [88] 
(Judge Williamson). 
 87 Slater v Wimmer [2012] EWPCC 7 (16 February 2012). 
 88 Bamgboye v Reed [2004] EMLR 5, 87 [87] (Judge Williamson). 
 89 Although it seems clear that films and sound recordings may also be wholly computer-
generated, such that there is no author. 
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a virtually identical phrase in these other contexts should be highly persuasive 
when construing s 9(3) or an equivalent deeming provision.90 
E  Judicial Consideration of s 9(3) of the UK Act 
It seems only one case has seriously considered s 9(3) of the UK Act.91 In No-
va Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd 92 the parties were competing man-
ufacturers of electronic pool games. Nova had two directors and principal 
shareholders, Mr Robinson and Mr Jones. Jones was primarily responsible for 
designing the games and Robinson was primarily responsible for the com-
mercial and administrative aspects of the business. Nova claimed copyright in 
the bitmap graphics, and the frames generated and displayed to the user when 
its game was played, and alleged that its copyright in these artistic works was 
infringed. Bitmap files are essentially images which ‘create a visual effect 
which is very similar to that of a painting or drawing’93 (in this case, images of 
balls, pool cues in various orientations and at various distances to the ball, 
and a pool table). The bitmap files were created by Jones, ‘using various com-
puter tools such as the mouse and on-screen tools such as notional brushes 
and pencils and the screen colour palette.’94 These bitmap images are stored in 
the computer memory.95 When the game is played, the software then ‘builds 
up composite images by taking, for example, the bitmap image of the table 
and then overlaying it with images of the balls, cue and the like.’96 The soft-
ware causes a series of composite frames to appear onscreen, which creates an 
impression of movement similar to framed animation. Each of these frames ‘is 
again a composite image and stored in the computer memory.’97  
Although the bitmap files were artistic works, ‘[i]t was not suggested that 
the defendants’ games involve a reproduction of any particular bitmap files as 
 
 90 Although note that the only case to consider s 9(3) of Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(UK) c 48 did not consider these provisions and their juridical interpretation. It is fair to say, 
however, that s 9(3) was not carefully considered by that court. 
 91 However, the provision was mentioned very briefly in Bamgboye v Reed [2004] EMLR 5, 
73 [38], where Judge Williamson noted that s 9(3) ‘is dealing with the case where one is look-
ing at a piece of music which, in fact, is composed of computerised sounds.’ 
 92 [2006] RPC 379. 
 93 Ibid 398 [101] (Kitchin J). 
 94 Ibid. 
 95 Ibid. 
 96 Ibid 398 [102]. 
 97 Ibid 398 [103]. 
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such, but rather of the composite frames which are displayed upon the 
screen.’98 Thus, the critical issue was whether copyright in the computer-
generated composite frames displayed to the user had been infringed. In other 
words, these computer-generated frames were treated as separate artistic 
works to the bitmap files themselves. Further, it seems that these composite 
frames did not come into existence in their particular configuration until their 
component bitmap images were ‘called up’ by the software and layered togeth-
er. That seems to be the reason Kitchin J regarded the composite frames to be 
‘authorless’, even though there was clearly a human author of the bitmap files 
comprising the composite image. 
This point is arguable. The argument for a lack of authorship is that Jones 
had no means of predicting the particular configuration of bitmap images in 
any given frame. That depended on how the game was played. However, the 
composite frames would always be a combination of bitmap images authored 
by Jones, and thus his mind and will directs the shape of the computer-
generated composite image. Nevertheless, as suggested above, with a deeming 
provision such as s 9(3) there seems little benefit in arguing the point, particu-
larly since Jones was an officer and employee of the corporate copyright own-
er. Kitchin J thus relied on s 9(3) and concluded: 
In so far as each composite frame is a computer generated work then the ar-
rangements necessary for the creation of the work were undertaken by Mr 
Jones because he devised the appearance of the various elements of the game and 
the rules and logic by which each frame is generated and he wrote the relevant 
computer program. In these circumstances I am satisfied that Mr Jones is the 
person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the works were 
undertaken and therefore is deemed to be the author by virtue of s 9(3).99 
Kitchin J accepted that: 
The appearance of any particular screen depends to some extent on the way the 
game is being played. For example, when the rotary knob is turned the cue ro-
tates around the cue ball. Similarly, the power of the shot is affected by the pre-
cise moment the player chooses to press the play button.100  
However, the player was not the person ‘making the arrangements’ because 
 
 98 Ibid 397 [98]. 
 99 Ibid 398–9 [105] (emphasis added). 
 100 Ibid 399 [106]. 
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[t]he player is not … an author of any of the artistic works created in the suc-
cessive frame images. His input is not artistic in nature and he has contributed 
no skill or labour of an artistic kind. Nor has he undertaken any of the arrange-
ments necessary for the creation of the frame images. All he has done is to play 
the game.101 
It is puzzling that Kitchin J did not consider the identical wording in s 178 
of the UK Act, or the authorities referred to above in relation to film and 
sound recording authorship. It is equally puzzling that Kitchin J, when articu-
lating the relevant criteria, referred exclusively to the more conventionally 
authorial aspects of Jones’ conduct — devising the appearance of the various 
elements of the game and the rules and logic by which each frame is generat-
ed, and writing the software — when the provision presumes a missing au-
thor. There was no mention of investment or a broader coordination of ar-
rangements. The, perhaps strong, possibility of the company being the rele-
vant person was not explored. 
However, the judgment is perhaps unsurprising and appropriate on its 
facts. Neither subsistence in, nor ownership of, the artistic works was contest-
ed, and thus Kitchin J did not comprehensively consider s 9(3), applying it 
only in the process of identifying the copyright works at issue. Further, while 
his co-director, Robinson, undertook essential arrangements with respect to 
the broader financial administration of the company, and shared the intention 
to make the game, Jones essentially undertook all relevant arrangements lead-
ing to its actual creation. As a shareholder, he also co-owned the software and 
the machines in which the software functioned, as well as the company which 
supplied the funding to make the game. Apart from the company and Robin-
son, the only other candidate, the user, merely plays the games. Thus, merely 
being causally responsible for the final trigger creating the work (playing the 
game) cannot be equated with ‘making arrangements’. Note that the statute 
does not use the words ‘cause the work to be created’, but deliberately adopts 
the phrase ‘making arrangements necessary for the creation’. 
However, the judgment needs to be treated with caution if it suggests all 
programmers are necessarily the persons making the arrangements simply 
because they wrote the software. Jones’ position can be contrasted with the 
author of, for example, MYOB software, who has no direct relationship with 
or control over the accounts created through the use of the software. It would 
be incongruous to suggest the author of such ‘off the shelf ’ software ‘makes 
arrangements’ to create, through the agency of remote purchasers, a multitude 
 
 101 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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of works at some possibly distant point in time. That phrase contemplates 
more immediate steps leading to production, hence the importance of  
proximity. 
When interpreting ‘making arrangements necessary for the creation’ one 
should also consider the intention of the various candidates. In the above  
example, the MYOB author in truth makes arrangements, and intends to,  
sell software, whereas the user/owner makes arrangements, and intends to,  
create works. 
F  Application of a Deeming Provision to  
Various Computer-Generated Works 
Depending on the facts, there is sufficient flexibility in the provision to ac-
commodate a range of candidates as the deemed author, and it would be im-
prudent and unnecessary to nominate only one for all circumstances. Instead, 
all relevant factors should be considered and balanced against each other. 
While it may be convenient to have greater consistency and predictability  
with a ‘bright-line’ rule, a case by case consideration may be the only possible  
approach. 
For example, in the case of the generative art discussed in Part 1, the user 
may be the only appropriate candidate. The user intends to create the work, 
and instigates its creation by commanding the software to run. The user may 
also be the investor if the generative software was purchased. The user makes 
all ‘necessary’ arrangements, including those most proximate to the act of 
materialising the work. This may be the preferable approach given the im-
portance of materialisation in conventional authorship jurisprudence.102 
On the other hand, if the user is simply someone pushing a button, then 
other factors assume greater importance. For example, a private contractor 
relieving a sick employee and told to ‘push this button at 3pm and tell me if 
the red warning light goes off while the system is running’ would not seriously 
be the relevant person. In that instance, it is more sensible to deem the owner 
of the system the author, especially if the owner originates the idea for, and 
intends to, create the work. 
In the case of partly computer-generated works which are substantially, 
though not wholly, shaped by software,103 then arrangements which contrib-
 
 102 See Pamela Samuelson, ‘Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works’ (1986) 
47 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 1185, 1202, 1224–8. 
 103 See generally Part 1 for a discussion of partly computer-generated works. This assumes such 
a person was not sufficiently responsible for the particular material expression of the com-
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ute to the design of the ultimate output may gain precedence. In that case a 
software selector or customizer may be the deemed author. This accords with 
the importance in conventional authorship jurisprudence of human intellec-
tual input directed to the final form of the output. It may be telling that the 
UK Act mandates that the principal director of a film be a joint author.104 
While the ‘principal director’ is not defined, he or she is generally regarded as 
the person with creative control of the making of the film.105 
1 Special Issues with Respect to Multi-Party Works 
Larger and more complex compilations are problematic under the proposed 
deeming provision, because: 
a) the chain of production is longer and more complex;  
b) the arrangements along that longer and more complex chain are usually 
undertaken by many people performing different roles; and 
c) the number of people involved may make identifying the relevant person 
or persons and the arrangements they undertake difficult, if not  
impossible. 
Who in these circumstances is the relevant person? It seems particularly ap-
posite to large, complex productions that multiple individuals performing 
different roles may in fact make the necessary arrangements.106 It should fol-
low that more than one person can be deemed an author. The singular refer-
ence to ‘the person’ in the definition is not decisive.107  
It may therefore be appealing to deem as author the corporate or natural 
person ultimately making the arrangements for engaging the individuals par-
ticipating in the creation of the work. This may often be the investor, or at 
least an employee of the investor. It is less likely to be a third party unrelated 
 
puter-generated work to ‘in fact’ be identified as an author. If that was established, as dis-
cussed above, the deeming provision would not apply and such person would be considered 
the author under conventional authorship principles. 
 104 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 10(1A). 
 105 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2011) 429 [7.41], approved in Slater v Wimmer [2012] EW-
PCC 7 (16 February 2012) [72] (Judge Birss). 
 106 And indeed, perhaps this is why under the UK Act a film is necessarily treated as a work of 
joint authorship between the producer and the principal director (unless they are the same 
person): Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 10(1A). 
 107 Section 23(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides that ‘words in the singular 
number include the plural’, and any Australian provision could clarify that. 
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to the investor. This has the advantage of encompassing under the umbrella of 
that ultimate arranger both employees and third parties, thus avoiding the 
possibility of copyright ownership being allocated to a third party making no 
financial contribution to the production. It also eases the evidentiary burden 
of identifying all the parties who could be deemed authors, and avoids the 
difficulty of fitting the jointly produced output into the definition of a work of 
joint authorship, discussed further below. 
Unlike the United States’ work for hire doctrine,108 or the Australian em-
ployment ownership exception,109 there need be no contractual arrangement 
between this ultimate organiser and the contributing individuals working 
under him or her. However, the person must be said to make the necessary 
arrangements for the creation of the work. This supervisory conduct is more 
distant from the final act of creation because, in effect, the person arranges the 
arrangements. However, that may be just the type of conduct envisaged by the 
statute wording. Note, in particular, that the relevant conduct is to make ar-
rangements necessary for the creation of the work (implicitly by someone 
else), not to create the work per se.110 Thus, the section seems deliberately tar-
geted at the person who stands above the materialiser. 
Further, deeming this umbrella ‘arranger’ the author satisfies many of the 
factors enumerated above, particularly if the person also paid for the work, 
intended to create the work, designed the work (or, in the case of a corpora-
tion, its employees or contracting parties did), and owned the machines 
and/or the software generating the output. Thus, there is merit in deeming, in 
the right circumstances, such an overarching organiser as author. Where the 
output is in truth a work of joint authorship by one or more such persons, the 
deeming provision should also accommodate deemed joint authorship of the 
output, even between corporations and individuals. 
G  Duration of Copyright under a Deeming Provision 
Ordinarily, the duration of a copyright work is governed by the life and death 
of individuals. If the work is published before the death of its author, duration 
is determined by the life of the author, and the author who died last if there 
 
 108 See generally the brief discussion of work for hire doctrine in above n 23. 
 109 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 35(6). 
 110 See Slater v Wimmer [2012] EWPCC 7 (16 February 2012) [80] (Judge Birss): ‘The definition 
does not simply refer to the person who made the film, it focuses on the person undertaking 
the necessary arrangements for doing so.’ 
2013] Curing the Authorless Void 71 
are multiple authors.111 Where the author died prior to publication, duration 
runs from the first date of publication, however, duration is still reliant on that 
author’s death.112 This is consistent with the Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works’ (‘Berne Convention’) pre-computer age 
requirement that duration be determined by the life of the author in the case 
of literary, musical and dramatic works.113 In respect of artistic works, the 
Berne Convention stipulates that duration can be based on the date the work 
was made.114 
Where the deemed author is a natural person, these provisions can contin-
ue to apply. However, deemed corporate authorship requires modification of 
the duration provisions and may raise issues about Berne Convention compli-
ance. An option is to determine duration by date of first publication. The UK 
Act determines duration based on the date the work was made.115 While this 
may impose a higher evidentiary burden, since the creation date is usually less 
clear than a date of death, it may be the only workable solution. However, giv-
en that the computer-generated output is still a ‘work’ (albeit with a fictional 
author), this would apparently mandate compliance with the Berne Conven-
tion. One could argue that Option 1 creates a new category of work, a ‘com-
puter-generated work’, which is not governed by the Berne Convention, per-
mitting customised treatment of duration. In short, the duration of computer-
generated works, and the means of fixing duration, will require careful con-
sideration both on policy grounds and in the context of Australia’s interna-
tional obligations. 
 
 111 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 33(2). The duration of protection for a literary, dramatic, musical 
or artistic is the life of the author plus 70 years. Section 80 provides that the references in s 33 
to the author of a work shall, in relation to a work of joint authorship, be read as references to 
the author who died last. 
 112 Ibid s 33(3): if a literary work (other than a computer program) or a dramatic or musical 
work is unpublished at the death of the author, the duration of protection is ordinarily 70 
years after the date of first publication. 
 113 Opened for signature 14 July 1967, 828 UNTS 222 (entered into force 29 January 1970) 
art 7(1). 
 114 Ibid art 7(4). 
 115 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 12(7). Note that copyright protection of 
computer-generated works is limited to 50 years from the year the work was made. 
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H  Moral Rights and Deemed Authorship  
The problem of moral rights arises because only a human can be an ‘author’ of 
a work.116 The proposed deeming provision solves the problem by fictionalis-
ing an author. A fictitious author should not enjoy moral rights, which are so 
inextricably linked to the personality of human authors. No authorial person-
ality is expressed in computerised output. Further, given that the deeming 
provision may extend to a corporate author, it is inconsistent with existing 
provisions which deny moral rights to corporations.117 It is noteworthy that 
other jurisdictions incorporating a deeming provision exclude moral rights in 
respect of computer-generated works.118 
I  Amend the Definition of a Work of Joint Authorship? 
Where CGM is created by many individuals, it is tempting to argue that it is a 
work of joint authorship (‘WOJA’).119 However, Part 1 demonstrates the diffi-
culty in identifying an author among the potentially hundreds of humans in-
volved in a multi-party computerised production. In the absence of authors, 
there can never be a work of joint authorship, rendering the definition120 of a 
WOJA irrelevant. However, two questions merit further consideration: 
 
 116 See, eg, CLRC, Simplification of the Copyright Act Report, above n 9, 57 [5.43]:  
It is generally accepted that only a human can be the ‘author’ of a work. This acceptance 
reflects the historical understanding that works are the products of the human intellect; 
in this sense it is said works are creations as distinct from artefacts of production. This 
acceptance also explains the application of moral rights to works but not to other subject 
matter protected by copyright; only authors need rights to protect their non-economic (ie 
moral) interests. 
 117 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 190. 
 118 See, eg, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, ss 79, 81, which provide that the 
right of paternity and the right to object to derogatory treatment do not apply to computer-
generated works. See also Copyright Act 1994 (NZ) ss 97(2)(b), 100(2)(b). 
 119 This was the primary argument in Phone Directories (2010) 264 ALR 617, 624 [20], where 
Gordon J was testing the argument that each directory was a single work of joint authorship. 
Her Honour noted: ‘The issue is whether the applicants, on the basis of joint authorship in 
the directories, have been able to identify the joint authors. This is essential for copyright to 
subsist in the Works. Manifestly, they have not.’: at 683 [333]. 
 120 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 10(1) defines a ‘work of joint authorship’ as ‘a work that has been 
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors and in which the contribution of each 
author is not separate from the contribution of the other author or the contributions of the 
other authors.’ 
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• Could the definition of a WOJA be amended to ameliorate these problems 
affecting multi-party computerised productions (thus reducing the need 
for a deeming provision)? 
• If multiple authors are deemed,121 must the computer-generated output 
meet the definition of a WOJA?  
1 Could the Definition of a Work of Joint Authorship be Amended? 
It would be extremely difficult to amend the definition of a WOJA to accom-
modate multi-party, authorless, computer productions. This is because the 
critical problem is a lack of authors, whereas the definition of a WOJA as-
sumes their existence. The definition of a WOJA cannot assist in finding au-
thors. It merely conditions what those authors must do for their work to be 
considered a single work. 
In any event, any amendment would need to be carefully considered, since 
it would apply to all ‘works’, not just computer-generated works. Further, the 
presumed policy rationale informing the definition must also be kept in mind. 
The definition is apparently designed to deliberately narrow and simplify 
ownership claims and prevent the unwieldy result of potentially hundreds of 
authors making joint ownership claims to a work. Although the definition is 
bolstered by ownership rules which limit multiple ownership claims,122 ‘open-
ing up’ computer-produced productions to multiple authorship claims un-
dermines the definition’s rationale. 
2 Where Authorship is Deemed 
The deeming provision only applies where a computer-generated work has no 
identifiable human author. It was suggested above that the optimal deemed 
author of a multi-party production is the overarching producer. In that case 
we have a work with only one ‘author’ and the definition of a WOJA has  
no application.123  
However, while it may be rare,124 more than one person may be the rele-
vant person, especially in relation to a large and complex work. In that case, 
 
 121 Assuming a deeming provision is inserted into the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
 122 For example, where the individuals involved are either employees or assignors of their own-
ership interest. For further detail about employees, see Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 35(6). 
 123 This is the case despite the fact that the work is produced by many individuals. It is also con-
sistent with conventionally produced works created by the contribution of many individuals, 
only one of whom makes a substantively authorial contribution. 
 124 Particularly if the more appealing and efficacious option of identifying an ‘umbrella’ arranger 
is pursued. 
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we now have multiple authors, presumably of a work. This implies that the 
work must satisfy the three (exhaustive) statutory criteria of authorship, col-
laboration and non-separate contributions. The first condition of authorship 
(albeit fictionalised) is satisfied through the deeming provision. However, the 
remaining conditions of collaboration and inseparability of contribution — 
which both concern conventional authorship — must now be applied to the 
conduct of arrangers rather than authors. Forcing non-authorial ‘arrange-
ments’ into a definition concerned with conventional authorial conduct is 
problematic. Fictionalised deemed authorship is focused on necessary ar-
rangements. Ordinary joint authorship is focused on collaboration and insep-
arability. Arrangements may or may not involve collaboration, and they may 
or may not be inseparable. The use of the word ‘contribution’ may also pose 
difficulties. While arrangements, broadly interpreted, may be ‘contributions’ 
within the meaning of the statutory definition, IceTV requires contribution  
to the material form of the work, not just involvement generally as labour  
(or ‘arrangements’). 
There are no persuasive policy reasons for compelling fictionalised authors 
to comply with the definition of a WOJA. It is therefore preferable to separate-
ly define a computer-generated WOJA, and to clarify that the existing defini-
tion of a WOJA does not apply to a computer-generated work. Suggested 
amendments to the definitions in s 10(1) of the Act are as follows:  
a computer-generated work of joint authorship is a work that has been produced 
by the arrangements of two or more of the persons taken to be the author of a 
computer-generated work. 
The existing definition of a work of joint authorship should be amended (as 
indicated in italics) to read:  
A work of joint authorship (other than a computer-generated work of joint au-
thorship) is a work that has been produced by the collaboration of two or more 
authors and in which the contribution of each author is not separate from the 
contribution of the other author or the contributions of the other authors. 
The alternative is to attempt to satisfy the existing definition of a WOJA. 
The scant judicial guidance on joint authorship of computer-generated 
works125 suggests this will be very difficult. In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Desk-
 
 125 The question of joint authorship was not closely scrutinised in Phone Directories (2010) 264 
ALR 617 or on appeal because the issue was determined based on a lack of identification of 
those authors and a lack of authorship per se due to the use of computers. At first instance, 
Gordon J noted that ‘given the simple and undeniable fact that the applicants have failed to 
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top Marketing Systems Pty Ltd (‘Desktop’), Finkelstein J referred to the ‘literally 
hundreds of appropriately trained or qualified employees who make some 
contribution towards the production of a telephone directory’126 and asked 
‘[i]s every employee who contributes to the final product a joint author of the 
directory?’127 His Honour responded to his own question: ‘These are difficult 
questions for which there are no ready answers.’128 
3 Collaboration by Joint ‘Authors’ 
There is little judicial discussion of the criterion of collaboration. The Mac-
quarie Dictionary defines ‘collaborate’ as ‘to work, one with another; cooper-
ate, as in literary work’.129 Several English cases require collaboration and a 
common design to produce the work.130 This seems sensible, otherwise it may 
not be clear what the putative joint authors are collaborating to achieve. 
Both Phone Directories and the appeal decision suggest the collaboration 
criterion is unlikely to be satisfied in complex computer-generated works, 
without fully explaining why. At first instance, Gordon J seriously ques-
tioned131 whether ‘the gamut of individuals’ working on the directory were 
collaborating as joint authors, and said ‘[t]he evidence demonstrated time and 
again that many of the staff perform their function separately from and often 
oblivious to the function of others’.132 However, performing functions ‘sepa-
rately’ is not necessarily inconsistent with collaboration, provided that sepa-
rate work is in pursuit of a common design.133 The requirement that the au-
thors not be ‘oblivious to the function of others’ suggests that collaboration 
requires knowledge of what the other deemed authors are doing. The degree 
 
prove the identity of the authors who contributed to the Works, it is unnecessary to consider 
[the issue of joint authorship] further’: at 684 [337]. 
 126 (2001) 181 ALR 134, 136 [4]. 
 127 Ibid. 
 128 Ibid. 
 129 See also Susan Butler (ed), Macquarie Dictionary (5th ed, 2009) 275, which defines ‘cooperate’ 
as ‘to work or act together or jointly; unite in producing an effect’. 
 130 See, eg, Beckingham v Hodgens [2004] ECDR 6, 59–60 [49]–[52] (Parker LJ); Levy v Rutley 
[1871] LR 6 CP 523, 529 (Keating J), 530 (Montague Smith J). See also Najma Heptulla v Ori-
ent Longman Ltd [1989] FSR 598, 609 (Kirpal J) (High Court of Delhi): ‘pre-concerted joint 
design’. 
 131 Phone Directories (2010) 264 ALR 617, 684 [337]. 
 132 Ibid. 
 133 See, eg, Milwell Pty Ltd v Olympic Amusements Pty Ltd (1999) 85 FCR 436, 446–7 [36] (Lee, 
von Doussa and Heerey JJ), where the skill and effort of the mathematicians and the employ-
ees of Olympic could be separated, but where the Court accepted that the prize scales were 
nevertheless derived from their ‘joint efforts’. 
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of knowledge is not explained, in particular whether each author must know 
the detail of what the others are doing, or whether it is sufficient to know that 
each is working to a common design of producing the directory. 
On appeal, Keane CJ agreed with Gordon J:  
The contributions of individuals discussed in her Honour’s findings may have 
been precursors to the compilation of the directories but they were not part of 
the actual compilation. Moreover, the work of these individuals was not collab-
orative. It was, no doubt, organised to facilitate the production of the directo-
ries but this organisation was not collaboration of the kind contemplated by the 
definition of joint authorship, and the contribution of each of the groups of in-
dividuals referred to earlier was made quite separately.134  
Whether arrangers (or any persons) collaborate in the creation of a com-
puter-generated work will be a question of fact depending on the nature of the 
work, and the extent to which the arrangers must communicate and share 
knowledge of each other’s functions. The sheer size and complexity of multi-
authored computer-generated works may necessitate division of tasks into 
distinct elements overseen independently by different arrangers. On the other 
hand, because a multi-authored computer-generated work is an organised 
assembly of integers, it may also demand conferencing and direct coopera-
tion. Indeed, it would seem impossible to effect such a complicated creation 
without collaboration between persons who are, in fact, arranging. 
However, Keane CJ seems to discount arrangement as authorial conduct, 
in holding that the individual authors’ organisation ‘to facilitate the produc-
tion of the directories … was not collaboration of the kind contemplated by 
the definition of joint authorship’.135 The reasons for this conclusion are not 
provided, however, the suggestion is that these contributions were too ante-
cedent to the physical production of the directory. In any event, if organisa-
tion per se is not collaboration, then it is difficult to see how arrangement is. 
4 Non-Separability of Contributions 
There has also been scant judicial attention to the ‘non-separability’ criterion. 
Yates J has said ‘[t]he precise additional limit intended to be imposed by that 
requirement is not clear.’136 One English case suggests that non-separateness 
 
 134 Phone Directories (Appeal) (2010) 194 FCR 142, 171 [92]. 
 135 Ibid. Although clearly the skill and judgement involved in ‘arranging’ material in a compila-
tion would qualify. The deeming provision discussed in this article is referring to preparatory 
arrangements for the computer generation of material. 
 136 Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd v Tonnex International Pty Ltd (2011) 91 IPR 488, 501 [53]. 
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requires ‘not separate interests in parts of a piece, — a joint tenancy, so to 
speak, in the entire work.’137 This suggests that the individual contributions 
should not be perceptible as such (such as separate chapters of a text).138 
However, this may also relate to the manner in which the work is undertak-
en.139 This also highlights the close link between inseparability and collabora-
tion, since independent work often leads to discernibly separate form. Wheth-
er this factor is satisfied in the context of computer-generated works will, of 
course, depend on the facts of each case. However, it is more difficult to per-
ceive obvious divisions between the contributions of arrangers in the finished 
form of computerised multi-party works.140  
5 Reform of the Definition of Joint Authorship? 
Clearly, the definition of a WOJA is too restrictive to encompass many mod-
ern complex productions created by multiple individuals. Many of the ele-
ments of the definition may be considered anachronistic. Are there good poli-
cy reasons for continuing to insist on collaboration between the individual 
authors? Why does joint organisation fall short of collaboration?  
Similarly, is it important or desirable that the elements of the joint work be 
inseparable? Presumably the inseparability requirement is necessary because 
if the creative effort of the various contributors produces perceptibly distinct 
works, then separate copyright may subsist, in which case there would be no 
need for joint authorship (and ownership). However, there is an important 
difference with respect to computer-generated works. If a conventionally au-
thored work fails the definition of a work of joint authorship due to lack of 
collaboration, the result will often be a series of single, separately authored 
works in which copyright subsists. However, with computer-generated works 
that is unlikely to be the case. Usually one work is created using the automated 
computer processes. If its ‘authors’ fail to collaborate and/or their contribu-
tions (‘arrangements’) are separable, then we cannot allocate discrete works to 
 
 137 Levy v Rutley [1871] LR 6 CP 523, 531 (Montague Smith J). 
 138 This is ‘[t]he example often given’ of separateness: Beckingham v Hodgens [2003] ECDR 6, 
59 [46] (Judge Floyd). 
 139 See, eg, Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Reed International Books Australia Pty Ltd 
(2010) 189 FCR 109, 134 [101] (Bennett J), where a newspaper article and its headline were 
found not to be a work of joint authorship. Notwithstanding that, objectively, the distinction 
between the headline and the content of the article may be imperceptible, Bennett J focused 
on the separate work undertaken by the author of the headline compared to the author of the 
article. 
 140 Compared to the classic examples of separate contributions such as separate chapters, lyrics 
and music. 
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each author. If there were joint deemed authors, but those arrangers did not in 
fact produce a WOJA as defined, then is there simply no work?  
J  Conclusions — Option 1 
Option 1 is a workable solution to the problems outlined in Part 1. In particu-
lar, by fictionalising an author where one is absent, it restores authorship 
 to CGM which would otherwise be a copyright work. This generates issues  
in respect of corporate authorship, duration, moral rights and possibly joint  
authorship; however, these are merely issues rather than insurmountable  
obstacles. They can be resolved with careful consideration, some compromise  
and drafting. 
IV  O P T IO N  2:  CL A S S I F Y  COM P U T E R-G E N E R AT E D  MAT E R IA L S   
A S  SU B J E C T  M AT T E R  OT H E R  T HA N  WO R K S   
The difficulty, or perhaps more accurately, the incongruity, of fitting authorless 
works into a legislative scheme requiring authors was recognised by the 
CLRC141 and by Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in IceTV.142 Given its au-
thorless status, computer-produced material seems more amenable to the 
‘authorless’ domain of Part IV of the Act.143 That reasoning was accepted by 
 
 141 CLRC, Computer Software Protection Report, above n 9, [13.13]–[13.14]:  
A number of submissions received by the Committee following the release of the Draft 
Report did not support the Committee’s classification of ‘computer-generated works’ as 
‘works’ under the Act … The Committee … notes that while there are a variety of ways in 
which copyright systems around the world provide protection to the various subject mat-
ters they encompass, those materials which are protected as ‘works’ have a human author. 
  Similar submissions were made to the CLRC’s Simplification Inquiry. See CLRC, Simplifica-
tion of the Copyright Act Report, above n 9, 25 [3.40]:  
The related issue of the protection of computer-generated material (where there is no 
clearly identifiable human author) provoked similar differing responses. It was argued by 
some copyright owner interests that such material did not have a requisite degree of orig-
inality and could not be protected as an original ‘work’ and should therefore be protected 
as Part IV subject matter. 
 142 (2009) 239 CLR 458, 506 [145], where their Honours recognised ‘the difficulties of adapting 
the provisions of Pt III of the Act to cases such as the present, where multiple works and au-
thors might be identified and the requisite expression of “authorship” of each may be dictated 
by a specific commercial objective.’ 
 143 See, eg, Jane Ginsburg, ‘The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law’ (2003) 
52 DePaul Law Review 1063, 1070; J A L Sterling, ‘Philosophical and Legal Challenges in the 
Context of Copyright and Digital Technology’ (2000) 31 International Review of Industrial 
Property and Copyright Law 508, 513:  
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the CLRC, which recommended establishing ‘computer-generated material’ as 
a new category of Part IV subject matter.144 Since the CLRC has directly con-
sidered this issue, it is useful to critically review its recommendations as a 
basis for exploring Option 2. 
A  How the Scheme Would Work 
1 Define Computer-Generated Material 
A definition of CGM is required to define the subject matter and clarify that it 
is not a ‘work’. For the reasons explored in relation to Option 1, a definition of 
CGM which accommodates the extreme difficulty or impossibility of identify-
ing the human authors is preferred. Thus, the following italicised change to 
the CLRC’s recommended definition145 is suggested: 
‘computer-generated’, in relation to computer-generated material, means that 
the material is generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no 
identifiable human author of the material. 
 
This is not to say, however, that computer-generated productions in which the creative 
contribution of the human being cannot be perceptibly identified should have no protec-
tion. On the contrary, such productions will normally result from organisational, techno-
logical or other investment. That investment should be protected, and it will be normal, 
and within the existing concepts, to award such productions a related right, the owner of 
the right being the person who has made the relevant investment. 
  Unlike Part III works, subject matter protected in Part IV of the Act does not require an 
author. Instead, copyright subsistence is dependent on, and ownership is conferred on ‘mak-
ers’ of films, sound recordings and broadcasts, and publishers of published editions: Copy-
right Act 1968 (Cth) ss 97(2) (sound recordings), 98(2) (films), 99 (broadcasts), 100 (pub-
lished editions). 
 144 CLRC, Computer Software Protection Report, above n 9, [13.17]:  
Under the Act the neighbouring rights of producers of phonograms (sound recordings) 
and broadcasters are protected as subject matter other than works. Having regard to this 
and the reasons given above, the Committee considers that it is appropriate to afford pro-
tection, as subject matter other than works, to a new class of subject matter to be de-
scribed as ‘computer-generated material’. 
  See also CLRC, Simplification of the Copyright Act Report, above n 9, 45 [5.05]: ‘The majority 
of the Committee agrees with the general view contained in the submissions it received that 
there is a fundamental difference between the types of subject matter that fall within Parts III 
and IV of the Act’. 
 145 CLRC, Computer Software Protection Report, above n 9, [13.18]. 
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2 Employ a Deeming Provision  
Consistent with other Part IV subject matter, it is necessary to determine who 
made the CGM and who owns the resulting copyright. The CLRC recom-
mended a deeming provision in virtually identical terms to s 9(3) of the  
UK Act: 
In the case of computer-generated material, the author shall be taken to be the 
person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the material 
are undertaken.146 
This wording could be utilised, except that ‘author’ should be replaced by 
‘maker’ to achieve consistency with other Part IV subject matter, and to clarify 
that the relevant person is not an author capable of enjoying moral rights. 
The CLRC clearly regards the ‘investor or owner of the comput-
er/computer program’147 as the relevant person and deserving owner. Howev-
er, the discussion above in relation to Option 1 questions whether the defini-
tion can be dispensed with quite so simply. It is particularly uncertain wheth-
er a programmer should be classified as the maker of CGM. It is also ques-
tionable whether the CLRC was correct in stating that  
the determination of the issue of who is the person that arranges for the crea-
tion of the work/materials should not be any more difficult than determining 
the identity of the maker of a cinematograph film for the purposes of  
the Act.148 
B  Resolution of Problems 
The scheme ostensibly cures a number of the problems identified in Part 1. 
Many of these problems, however, are also cured by Option 1: 
1 Both Options 1 and 2 avoid the need to establish human authorship in 
fact. This is the critical problem affecting CGM and one that was dramati-
cally exposed in Phone Directories. Option 1 invents an author. However, 
Option 2 acknowledges that the material is authorless and therefore not a 
work, and avoids the ‘ruse’ of fictionalising an author through a deeming 
provision. Professor Ginsberg has criticised Option  1 as an ‘unfortunate, 
as well as confusing … conflat[ion of] authorship with vesting of copyright 
 
 146 Ibid [13.21]. 
 147 Ibid [13.20]. 
 148 Ibid [13.22]. 
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ownership’,149 and warns that ‘an unrelenting equation of the two leads to 
considerable incoherence’.150 She supports the role of Part IV in vesting 
‘ownership in productions whose human input is uncertain, without trick-
ing out the owner in the garb of an author.’151 
2 With both Options 1 and 2, automation of the output is immaterial. 
3 Both Options 1 and 2 simplify ownership, but neither completely avoids 
the risk of more than one person being deemed author or maker. Option 2 
is perhaps superior because the authorless protection in Part IV corre-
spondingly cures the problem of fitting multi-party computer-generated 
output into the definition of a WOJA, discussed above. 
4 Both Options 1 and 2 have the potential to reward the investor, thus sup-
porting an important policy basis for conferring protection on authorless, 
and often unoriginal, output. 
5 Protection in Part IV avoids the difficulty of identifying some CGM as 
‘works’ when they may not fit that definition. 
6 In attributing creation to ‘makers’ of ‘material’, it circumvents the risk in 
Option 1 that classifying authorless CGM as a ‘work’ is contrary to the 
Berne Convention.152  
7 The critical difference between Options 1 and 2 is that, in eliminating both 
the ‘author’ and a ‘work’, Option 2 will protect both original and unoriginal 
CGM.153 Option 2 therefore addresses the main reason for disquiet follow-
ing the shift away from labour-based protection in Desktop. However, it al-
so generates some potentially serious outcomes, which are explored below. 
 
 149 Ginsburg, above n 143, 1070. 
 150 Ibid. 
 151 Ibid. 
 152 CLRC, Computer Software Protection Report, above n 9, [13.14]. 
 153 Originality is not a necessary subsistence condition of Part IV subject matter (provided they 
are not copies). See CLRC, Computer Software Protection Report, above n 9, [13.14]: ‘The oth-
er requirement for copyright protection is that works of authorship must satisfy some notion 
of originality ie be the product of some skill and labour on the part of the author’. See also, at 
[13.16]:  
In so far as these types of computer-generated materials are deserving of protection it 
seems to the Committee that the protection that they should attract is more akin to that 
extended to neighbouring rights … One of the characteristics of this type of protection is 
that there is not the same need for originality. 
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The main issues that arise in respect of Option 2 can be summarised as  
follows:  
• classifying CGM; 
• competition concerns and other issues arising from the breadth of CGM; 
and 
• attenuated rights in Part IV. 
There are no major issues with respect to ownership and duration. 
C  Classifying CGM  
Option 2 may not avoid the difficulty, explored extensively in Part 1, of identi-
fying whether the output is computer-generated or authored material, or part-
ly computer-generated material. Option 1 reduces the practical significance of 
the debate, because in either case the output is a work, with either a natural or 
fictional author. However, the question is more pressing in Option 2 because 
the answer determines whether the output is protected in Part III as an au-
thored ‘work’ or Part IV as authorless ‘subject matter’. In some cases, parties 
may be prepared to concede the issue. However, if the rights or rules on own-
ership differ significantly, or there are other benefits to protection under Part 
III (particularly if the originality of the CGM is questionable), then this issue 
could be vigorously argued. The competing claims could be, for example, be-
tween an alleged author seeking protection in Part III and an ‘arranger’ seek-
ing protection in Part IV. These may be different people and thus ownership 
may turn on the issue. 
Alternatively, the CGM may not be original, in which case the owner of 
the CGM will argue it is Part IV CGM and an alleged infringer may argue it is 
not. Further contention may arise if the output is difficult to classify as a rec-
ognised ‘work’, in which case it may only achieve protection under Part IV. As 
discussed above, resolving these definitional issues could involve laborious, 
complex, difficult analysis which requires expensive evidence.154 Nevertheless, 
the scheme is an improvement on the current situation which results in an ‘all 
or nothing’ outcome. Further, such definitional debates are standard to all 
contests where a statutory definition must be applied to unique facts. 
 
 154 Which does not seem to have been acknowledged by the CLRC, Computer Software Protec-
tion Report, above n 9, [13.22]: ‘the drawing of a distinction between materials created with 
the assistance of a computer program and those that are computer-generated is one that will 
be able to be determined in each case having regard to the circumstances’. 
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D  Issues Arising Due to the Breadth of the Definition 
1 Breadth of ‘Computer-Generated Material’ 
‘Computer-generated material’ would be the broadest category of protected 
subject matter under the Act. Given the speed and trajectory of technological 
development, the category is perhaps immeasurably, and unendingly, broad. 
Any conceivable material which is substantially shaped by software, or where 
it is too difficult to establish the human authors in the automation process, 
would be captured by the term ‘computer-generated material’. 
This breadth of protected material highlights a major difference between 
Part III and Part IV protection. The former limits protection to recognisable 
‘works’. The extensive reach of CGM may therefore be advantageous in avoid-
ing the need to fit new forms of computer-generated creation into existing 
definitions of a work or Part IV subject matter.155 Indeed, the breadth of ‘ma-
terial’ is so wide relative to the four distinct works that more computer-
generated output is likely to be protected under Part IV than Part III. For ex-
ample, a computer-generated multimedia creation may not be protected as 
either a ‘work’156 or a film, but would clearly be ‘material’. Breadth in itself is 
not a bad thing, and broad definitions of protected material are embraced in 
some jurisdictions.157  
However, the breadth of CGM is also problematic, perhaps insolubly so. 
For one thing, the term ‘material’ may encompass both physical and digital 
material. Computers are now pervasive in manufacturing processes. Are all 
products processed on an automated production line ‘computer-generated 
material’? Presumably the output of three-dimensional printers would also be 
‘computer-generated material’. Being a mere copy of the item printed, the 
 
 155 Simplification of the categories of protected subject matter was the focus of recommenda-
tions by the CLRC in its Simplification of the Copyright Act Report, above n 9. See also 
Jessup J’s comments in Acohs (2010) 86 IPR 492, 520 [81]:  
I have difficulty with the concept that a database, as such, might be regarded as a literary 
work. The problem is not so much whether the database represents a compilation (in the 
sense of being otherwise disparate elements of data drawn together and organised ac-
cording to certain rules), but whether a body of data is capable of being regarded as a 
work in any sense unless and until it has taken a material form. 
  This suggests that the raw ‘body of data’ is not itself a literary work and cannot be one until it 
is assembled into the form of some recognisable work. 
 156 The strongest available argument is that it is a compilation (literary work). See Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) s 10(1) (definition of ‘literary work’). 
 157 See, eg, the French droit d’auteur (copyright), which protects any ‘œuvre de l’esprit’, or work of 
the mind, ‘whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose’: Code de la Propriété In-
tellectuelle [Intellectual Property Code] (France) art L112-1. 
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three-dimensional version of the item would never qualify as an original work 
under Option 1. However, without further qualifying amendments, or a defi-
nition of CGM which excludes three-dimensional forms, it could be protected 
under Part IV, where there is currently no express originality criterion.158  
Perhaps the simplest method of preventing protection of three-
dimensional computer-generated material would be to expressly exclude it 
from the definition. The definition could therefore read: 
‘computer-generated’, in relation to computer-generated material other than 
material in three-dimensional form, means that the material is generated by 
computer in circumstances such that there is no identifiable human author of 
the material.159 
Alternatively, the design/copyright overlap provisions160 could be extended to 
computer-generated material in three-dimensional form. 
The breadth of CGM may also raise difficult issues with respect to in-
fringement. While existing works may also be broadly defined,161 the un-
known limits of CGM may make determining a substantial part, for example, 
quite challenging. 
The critical outcome, however, is that the mere fact of material being com-
puter-generated would result in its protection. Protection as Part IV subject 
matter is considerably broader than that afforded under the European Data-
base Directive.162 It will arise from the mere fact of creation, without any con-
dition of, for example, substantial investment which is required for protection 
under the European Database Directive.163 CGM will also be protected even if 
it comprises mere information, data, or facts; has negligible or no originality; 
was created without any substantial investment; adversely affects competition; 
 
 158 Existing provisions only prevent copyright subsisting in same form copies of Part IV subject 
matter. See, eg, Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 90 (films), 22(3)(a) (sound recordings), 91 and 95 
(broadcasts), 92 (published editions). Note also that while the three-dimensional print of the 
rose would almost certainly infringe the copyright in the painted original, copyright may 
never the less subsist in the infringing version even if the copyright owner may be denied re-
lief on public policy grounds: A-One Accessory Imports Pty Ltd v Off Road Imports Pty Ltd 
[No 2] (1996) 66 FCR 199, 200–1 (Drummond J). 
 159 CLRC, Computer Software Protection Report, above n 9, [13.18] (suggested changes in italics). 
 160 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 74–7. 
 161 Particularly literary works, which are defined inclusively in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
s 10(1) (definition of ‘literary work’). 
 162 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
Legal Protection of Databases [1996] OJ L 77/20. 
 163 Ibid. 
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imposes burdensome social and commercial costs; or unduly restricts access 
to information. Part IV demonstrates that copyright protection in the absence 
of originality is not new. However, the concerns outlined above simply do  
not apply with the same force to existing Part IV subject matter.164 They may  
apply to some Part III subject matter,165 but the originality of such creations,  
together with a suite of exceptions, is considered to justify and control the  
copyright reward. 
Thus, the practical and policy implications of adopting Option 2 would 
need to be carefully considered. In particular, if adopted, Option 2 should be 
supported by an extension to CGM of the design/copyright overlap excep-
tions166 and the broader suite of exceptions in relation to works.167 It may also 
demand new exceptions, or modifications to the existing fair dealing excep-
tions, to address concerns about reduced access to information.168 Indeed, the 
sheer breadth of the protected subject matter may mandate an equally broad 
fair use defence, unconstrained by the narrow, defined purposes of the exist-
ing fair dealing exceptions.169 An alternative or additional safeguard may be a 
compulsory licence scheme to facilitate access to essential information con-
tained in unoriginal CGM. Since a common justification for protecting uno-
riginal material is the substantial investment in its creation,170 a subsistence 
condition of substantial investment in the CGM may also need to be intro-
duced, consistent with the European Database Directive. The White Pages 
 
 164 Unless, perhaps, it could be argued that the Part IV subject matter is the only record of in-
formation essential to further research or creation. 
 165 Such as ‘thinly’ original compilations of facts. 
 166 The design/copyright overlap exceptions are currently restricted to works. See Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) ss 74–7. 
 167 See generally Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt III div 3. 
 168 See, eg, the concerns of researchers arguing that copyright protection of unoriginal data 
hampers the generation of knowledge discussed in Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Copyright and the Digital Economy, Issues Paper No 42 (2012) 48–50 [168]–[181]. 
 169 However, the Australian Law Reform Commission is considering ‘whether existing excep-
tions are appropriate and whether further exceptions should recognise “fair use” of copyright 
material’: Ibid [271]. 
 170 See, eg, Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on 
the Legal Protection of Databases [1996] OJ L 77/20, recital 11; Chairman of the Committee of 
Experts, WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Ques-
tions, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Re-
spect of Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc CRNR/DC/6 
(1996) <http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=2487>; Gervais, above n 8, 
1111, 1122; Davison and Hugenholtz, above n 8, 113; Thompson, above n 8, 86. 
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may cost millions to produce171 and therefore deserve protection from free-
riding competitors, but commanding ‘robot’ software to trawl the internet and 
produce lists of vendible data may not. Both of these types of CGM would 
receive the same protection. 
The difficulty with the safeguards briefly explored above is that they would 
apply to both original and unoriginal CGM, whereas they would only be 
needed with respect to the latter. For example, a criterion of substantial in-
vestment may be apposite to a large, expensive, computer-generated compila-
tion, but it may be completely irrelevant to a computer-generated artwork. It 
would be unwieldy to attempt to separate, within Part IV, CGM into two dis-
crete categories: benign but otherwise original, and troublingly unoriginal 
material. Some suggested safeguards would also impact on the definition of 
the relevant person. For example, a criterion of substantial investment would 
always mean that the investor is the relevant person. 
The amount of tinkering required to address the issues explored above, 
and correctly balance the interests affected by Option 2, suggests that unorigi-
nal CGM must be separately protected. This would entail implementing  
Option 1 in respect of otherwise original works, and either Option 2 or  
sui generis legislation (each with a host of safeguards) to capture the  
unoriginal residue. 
2 Potential for Overlap between CGM and Other Subject Matter  
The breadth of CGM results in its potential overlap with other Part IV subject 
matter, and with Part III works. Within Part IV, films, sound recordings, 
broadcasts, and published editions could all be computer-generated. Perhaps 
such an overlap would be tolerable. In any event, a revised definition of CGM 
could avoid the overlap by including the following amendment: 
‘computer-generated’, in relation to computer-generated material other than a 
broadcast, cinematograph film, sound recording or published edition, or material 
in three-dimensional form, means that the material is generated by computer in 
circumstances such that there is no identifiable human author of the material. 
The potential for overlap and inconsistent treatment of substantially iden-
tical subject matter between Part III and Part IV requires discussion. For ex-
ample, a computer-generated image of a rose would be protected in Part IV, 
whereas an apparently identical hand painted picture of a rose would be pro-
 
 171 In Phone Directories (2010) 264 ALR 617, 639 [72], Gordon J stated that the eventual imple-
mentation of the computer system in issue took more than five years and cost in excess of 
$300 million. 
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tected in Part III. In each case different ownership rules and exclusive rights 
would apply. This may not be troubling if the human-authored work deserves 
superior protection. However, it is interesting to note that this risk of indistin-
guishable overlap applies to no other Part IV subject matter. This may be  
a further indication that the breadth of CGM makes it an awkward fit in 
Part IV. 
3 Computer-Generated Material Compared to Existing Part IV Subject Matter 
A point of difference between CGM and the existing subject matter is that the 
creations of the latter type are generally consistent in their nature. Films may 
be wildly different one from the other, however, each is essentially a ‘moving 
picture’.172 The same applies to the remaining Part IV subject matter. Sound 
recordings and broadcasts may record and broadcast a vast array of matter, 
but they are, at the end of the day, broadcasts and sound recordings. CGM, on 
the other hand, may be any conceivable material which is capable of comput-
er-generation, from a vast and complex database, to a computer-generated 
picture of a rose, to music. It is notable that a sound recording is not defined 
as ‘sound recorded material’. Neither is a film ‘filmed material’. They are their 
technology, utterly defined by it. Whereas CGM is defined by its technology 
only in the sense that it is material produced using a certain method of pro-
duction. The method of production of films and sound recordings is inconse-
quential — what matters is that a defined thing results. Thus, a sound record-
ing or film will always be defined by its characteristics as a specific type of 
material, whereas CGM is simply ‘material’. Again, this strong point of differ-
ence between the existing subject matter and CGM may be tolerable, however, 
it also may suggest that CGM fits more comfortably in Part III. 
CGM also differs significantly from other Part IV subject matter because 
the latter is generally dependent on underlying works (or some other material 
if not a copyright work). For example, a film usually has a screenplay; a sound 
recording must record other works or sounds; a broadcast must transmit data; 
a published edition is the typographical arrangement of other works. Software 
may modify existing material, but it may also literally produce material from 
 
 172 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1), where ‘cinematograph film’ is defined as  
the aggregate of the visual images embodied in an article or thing so as to be capable  
by the use of that article or thing (a) of being shown as a moving picture; or (b) of being  
embodied in another article or thing by the use of which it can be so shown; and includes 
the aggregate of the sounds embodied in a sound-track associated with such visual  
images. 
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nothing. This may not matter, but again, it highlights a fundamental difference 
between Part IV subject matter and CGM. 
On the other hand, all subject matter are located in Part IV at least in part 
because of their technological nature, not their content, and so CGM may fit 
here too for that reason. While CGM may not be a technological thing in the 
same way that a sound recording is, it is its technological method of produc-
tion which renders it authorless and thus a suitable candidate for Part IV  
protection. 
Also, Part IV subject matter is not protected in Part IV due only to its 
technology, or a lack of originality,173 but also often because authorship is 
difficult to determine. Films, for example, are authored works under art 2(1) 
of the Berne Convention, but it is the problems caused by a surplus of deserv-
ing authors and the need to narrow ownership claims that caused films to be 
situated in Part IV.174 Likewise, CGM is often a multi-party creation which 
raises complex authorship issues, and may be otherwise original,175 and thus 
may share more features with Part IV subject matter than first imagined. 
Finally, there is already a significant degree of tolerated difference between 
existing Part IV subject matter. A broadcast is vastly different to a published 
edition, for example. Therefore, adding CGM to this disparate assortment 
seems unobjectionable. 
E  Exclusive Rights 
Part IV rights are more attenuated than those accorded under Part III. As-
suming CGM would enjoy rights consistent with other Part IV subject matter, 
in the move to Part IV, CGM would lose the right of reproduction but obtain 
the right to make copies,176 and lose the right of performance and gain the 
right to cause the CGM to be seen or heard in public.177 It would lose entirely 
 
 173 Note, for example, the Spicer Committee in 1959 considered that the making of a sound 
recording required ‘a considerable amount of artistic and technical skill’: CLRC, Parliament 
of Australia, Report of the Committee Appointed by the Attorney-General of the Common-
wealth to Consider What Alterations Are Desirable in the Copyright Law of the Commonwealth 
(1959) 48 [241]. However, others see the protection of sound recordings as a means of trans-
ferring broadcasters’ revenue to producers: see, eg, Gervais, above n 8, 1120 n 47. 
 174 Ginsburg, above n 143, 1070–1. This also explains why authors of films enjoy moral rights. 
 175 Note in this regard how films and sound recordings are protected as ‘works’ under the Copy-
right, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 1(1)(b). 
 176 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 85(1)(a) (sound recordings), 86(a) (films). 
 177 Ibid ss 85(1)(b) (sound recordings), 86(b) (films). The rights of published editions and 
broadcasts are less relevant as the subject matter is quite different to CGM. 
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the rights of adaptation178 and first publication. Due to the propensity  
for overlap between ‘works’ and CGM, this diminution in rights could  
be problematic. 
Assuming a right to make a copy of the CGM is drafted in similar terms to 
the existing rights to make copies of films and sound recordings,179 it is likely 
to be more limited180 than a right of reproduction extending to all formats and 
dimensions.181 The scheme would mean that a conventionally produced art-
work could not be reproduced in any form, whereas the only limit on a com-
puter-generated artwork is a restriction on making a copy of it. 
Similarly, the lack of a right of adaptation may be problematic. It will mean 
that a conventionally created musical work cannot be adapted, but a comput-
er-generated musical work can be. How is the method of creation perceptible? 
The breadth of CGM and the potential for overlap with Part III works exacer-
bates infringement risks. 
The loss of a first publication right182 may also be significant. This would 
mean anyone could publish copies of a computer-generated artwork, but not a 
handpainted artwork, or artwork made with the aid of software. 
The public performance right183 may also raise issues. Where the CGM is 
in the form of a literary, dramatic or musical work,184 a right to restrict it be-
ing seen or heard in public may be narrower than a right to restrict a perfor-
mance of it. Causing a film or sound recording to be seen or heard in public 
 
 178 In any event, these rights would not have been enjoyed by computer-generated artworks. 
 179 For example, Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) provides that ‘copy, in relation to a cinemato-
graph film, means any article or thing in which the visual images or sounds comprising the 
film are embodied.’ Section 10(3)(c) provides that ‘a reference to a copy of a sound recording 
shall be read as a reference to a record embodying a sound recording or a substantial part of a 
sound recording being a record derived directly or indirectly from a record produced upon 
the making of a sound recording’. Section 10(1) defines ‘record’ to include ‘a disc, tape, paper, 
electronic file or other device in which sounds are embodied.’ 
 180 See CBS Records Australia Ltd v Telmak Teleproducts (Aust) Pty Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 48, where 
a ‘sound alike’ recording was found not to be a copy of the applicant’s record. Bowen CJ, not-
ed that section 10(3)(c) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) refers ‘to an actual embodiment of 
the very sounds on the original record however they may be copied’: at 51. 
 181 Subject to exceptions, for example the design-copyright overlap defence in ss 74–7 of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
 182 The publication of copyright material in a tangible form is the equivalent to the first making 
available to the public of the original and copies of the copyright material through sale or 
other transfer of ownership: Avel v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88. 
 183 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 27. 
 184 It should be noted that a literary, dramatic or music ‘work’ is not technically a ‘work’ since it 
is protected under Part IV (which concerns ‘subject matter other than works’). 
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would entail showing the film or playing the recording in a suitable device. 
The ‘performance’ of a work is defined in the Act to include ‘any mode of vis-
ual or aural presentation’ of a work.185 This may include its ‘mechanical’ per-
formance by simply playing a visual or audio record of it, and thus it overlaps 
with the Part IV right to have a copy seen or heard in public. However, it is a 
broader right because it also includes physical performances of the work. The 
reference to ‘presentation’ in the definition of ‘performance’ could suggest that 
broader performed ‘interpretations’ of a work are restricted under the per-
formance right. This is something which is not conceivable in Part IV because 
that only envisages a static copy of a film or sound recording being played on 
a device. For example, could this restrict the performed arrangement of a mu-
sical work, or a performance of a play or choreographic show that is only sub-
stantially similar to it? In contrast, the Part IV right is to cause the CGM to be 
seen or heard. This suggests a reference to the subject matter in its existing 
form and no other. This may mean that a computer-generated choreographic 
show,186 for example, will only be protected to the extent that it is ‘seen’ in its 
form recorded in the CGM, whereas a physical performance of the choreo-
graphed dance would infringe Part III copyright. 
In Part 1, it was argued that mere computer-generation of a work should 
not exclude the copyright reward. If that is the case, then why should the 
rights be different? The more attenuated rights afforded to CGM, which but 
for its computer generation would be a work, may require special modifica-
tion. Perhaps the simplest method would be to include a provision clarifying 
that if the CGM, but for the fact of computer-generation, would be a work 
protected under Part III, it shall enjoy the same rights as a Part III work. This 
would prevent material which appears substantially identical to Part III works 
obtaining significantly different rights. Alternatively, if the rights are more 
attenuated for this ‘overlap’ CGM, then that may be acceptable. The more ex-
pansive rights granted to works reflect the intellectual effort of authors, the 
lack of which explains the allocation of CGM to Part IV under Option 2. 
 
 185 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 27(1). 
 186 In relation to this fascinating method of producing choreography, see, eg, M Gough, ‘To-
wards Computer Generated Choreography: Epikinetic Composition’ on Splines in Space: 
Theorising Through (Dance) Practice (11 September 2005) <http://binarybutoh.blogspot.fr/ 
2005/09/towards-computer-generated.html>. 
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F  Ownership  
Ownership of CGM should not be any more problematic than other Part IV 
subject matter. Ideally, the same ownership rules should apply to CGM to 
achieve the greatest possible consistency with other Part IV subject matter. 
For that reason, a commissioner of CGM should be considered the owner.187  
G  International Obligations and Constitutionality 
There seems to be no constitutional restriction on protecting CGM under the 
copyright umbrella. It is also consistent with Australia’s international obliga-
tions, which only impose minimum legislative requirements.188  
H  Duration 
Duration of protection of CGM would need to be determined, but should not 
be problematic. Indeed, duration under Part IV is less difficult than under 
Part III, which relies on an author’s life. Copyright in sound recordings and 
films subsists until 70 years after the date of first publication.189 Broadcast 
copyright endures for 50 years after the broadcast is made,190 and published 
edition copyright for 25 years after first publication.191 
The CLRC advocated a shorter term of protection, reflecting ‘the fact that 
the object of protection is investment, rather than creativity’.192 However, this 
applies to all Part IV works, some of which now enjoy a period of protection 
comparable to works. To maintain consistency, it is therefore suggested that 
CGM enjoy the same period of protection as films and sound recordings. If 
CGM is also a broadcast or published edition, then the amendments to the 
definition suggested above will prevent overlap — it will simply be CGM. 
 
 187 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 97(3), 98(3), which provide respectively that the commis-
sioner of a sound recording or film is the copyright owner. 
 188 For example, ‘published editions’ are protected under Part IV despite being ignored under 
the international agreements: CLRC, Simplification of the Copyright Act Report, above n 9, 
16 [3.13]. 
 189 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 93–4. 
 190 Ibid s 95(1). 
 191 Ibid s 96. 
 192 CLRC, Computer Software Protection Report, above n 9, [13.16], [13.23], [2.42(d)]. 
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I  Conclusions — Option 2 
The incredible breadth of CGM raises a number of concerns, discussed above. 
These concerns primarily arise in respect of unoriginal CGM. However, it will 
be very difficult to address those concerns without also compromising and 
complicating protection for otherwise original CGM in Part IV. This suggests 
that authorless ‘works’ and authorless unoriginal material should be separately 
protected, with the former protected pursuant to Option 1. These concerns do 
not necessarily prevent protection of unoriginal material under Option 2, 
however, a suite of exceptions and controls will be necessary to make Option 
2 workable. The above discussion also describes some differences and simi-
larities between CGM and other Part IV subject matter, however, those differ-
ences are not in themselves a reason for abandoning Option 2. There are also 
perhaps significant differences in the rights enjoyed by CGM and works, 
which may require careful consideration. 
V  OP T IO N  3:  SU I  G E N E R I S  P R O T E C T I O N   
Diverse issues arise when attempting to supplement and loosen the existing 
provisions of the Act to protect CGM. The problem is exacerbated because 
CGM may be broadly divided into: (1) authorless, but otherwise original 
works with relatively benign social policy effects on the one hand; and (2) 
authorless and unoriginal material with damaging social policy effects on the 
other. Due to the potential adverse effects of protecting unoriginal CGM, per-
suasive justifications for its protection must be provided. If the reform objec-
tive is to protect only otherwise original authorless works, then, as mentioned 
above, Option 1 is a workable solution. Sui generis protection would only be 
necessary to achieve this objective if the fundamental importance of human 
authorship in traditional copyright law means that fictionalising CGM as an 
authored copyright ‘work’ is untenable. 
If the objective is to protect both original and unoriginal material,193 Op-
tion 1 must be excluded, because Part III works must be original. The substan-
tial amendments required to address the public policy and other issues trig-
gered by the breadth of CGM may render Option 2 too problematic.194 This 
 
 193 This was not the argument developed in Part 1, although it will no doubt be agitated by dis-
affected producers of CGM following IceTV (2009) 239 CLR 458 and Phone Directories 
(2010) 264 ALR 617, affd (2010) 194 FCR 142. 
 194 These problems were also noted by the CLRC in their Simplification of the Copyright Act 
Report, above n 9, 25 [3.40]: ‘Others argued that copyright was not a suitable form of protec-
tion for such material, and that it would be more appropriately protected through a new sui 
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suggests that sui generis protection outside copyright is the only comprehen-
sive reform option. However, the protection afforded to authorless and uno-
riginal CGM raises the same substantive issues relating to competing policy 
interests, subsistence conditions, duration, rights and exceptions, irrespective 
of the nomenclature and structure used to protect it. Therefore the critical 
task is to address those issues through legislative measures. This will  
either entail substantial amendment to the Act through Option 2, or  
substantial drafting of sui generis legislation. As a practical matter, once the 
issues have been addressed, the easier option should be pursued. It may tran-
spire that a suitably drafted Option 2 is a less laborious option than discrete 
tailored legislation. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to propose a comprehensive sui gene-
ris legislative model for the protection of all forms of CGM which addresses 
all of the issues discussed above. In Phone Directories, Gordon J emphatically 
urged Parliament to ‘expand protection consistent with that set out in the  
Directive’, and to do so ‘without delay’.195 In IceTV, Gummow, Hayne and  
Heydon JJ suggest that the European Database Directive196 is a possible solu-
tion to the lacuna generated by that decision.197 This was reiterated more 
bluntly by Gummow J during Telstra’s unsuccessful application for special 
leave to appeal in Phone Directories,198 where he recommended ‘agitating the 
legislature’ to remedy the gap in protection.199   
In its limitation to ‘databases’ (albeit broadly defined),200 the European Da-
tabase Directive201 is too restrictive to cure the problems identified in respect 
 
generis right similar to that afforded to non-original databases under the EC directive’. See al-
so Gervais, above n 8, 1135, arguing that ‘[c]opyright is not the proper vehicle to protect 
these non-creative, non-original compilations’. 
 195 (2010) 264 ALR 617, 628 [30]. 
 196 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
Legal Protection of Databases [1996] OJ L 77/20. 
 197 (2009) 239 CLR 458, 504 [135]: ‘It is significant for the issues on the present appeal that the 
Australian legislation has no counterpart [to the European Database Directive]’. Their Hon-
ours added, ‘[i]n the absence of implementation of laws analogous to the kind described in 
the Directive, the matters now in issue cannot be resolved by concluding, as did the Full 
Court … that Ice appropriated “the fruits of Nine’s skill and labour”’: at 504 [139]. 
 198 Transcript of Proceedings, Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd [2011] 
HCATrans 248 (2 September 2011) 266–7: ‘I think your client really needs something like a 
database directive which you do not have at the moment’. 
 199 Ibid 272–4. 
 200 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
Legal Protection of Databases [1996] OJ L 77/20, art 1(2) defines ‘database’ as ‘a collection of 
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of all CGM. In any event, it has been widely criticised. Detractors question the 
rationale for protecting databases when there is little evidence that sui generis 
protection incentivises the production of databases, and point to increased 
costs, including transaction and compliance costs; diminution of the public 
domain by the over-protection of facts; and monopoly pricing.202 It has been 
argued that ‘the Directive casts a net that is too broad, too unchecked by insti-
tutional balancing mechanisms, and too uncertain in many of its provisions to 
be a model for others’.203 The European Database Directive is also described as 
‘a good example of the perils of establishing sui generis rights’.204 It should 
therefore not be hastily imitated, whether to cure the lacuna identified in Part 
1, or the diminution in copyright protection caused by the review of originali-
ty in IceTV. In particular, a substantial body of jurisprudence on the European 
Database Directive is developing,205 and will be useful in crafting any legisla-
tive response modelled on it. 
For the purposes of this article, the salient features of the European Data-
base Directive are examined and compared with the reform models proposed 
in Options 1 and 2. The article evaluates those features to determine which 
may be usefully applied, modified or avoided, particularly to ameliorate the 
concerns outlined in relation to Option 2 above. 
A  Subsistence Criterion — Substantial Investment in  
Obtaining, Verifying, or Presenting the Contents of a Database  
The European Database Directive confers database protection in exchange for 
substantial investment in obtaining, verifying, or presenting the contents of 
 
independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and 
individually accessible by electronic or other means’. 
 201 Ibid. 
 202 See generally Thompson, above n 8. 
 203 C D Freedman, ‘Should Canada Enact a New Sui Generis Database Right?’ (2002) 13 Ford-
ham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 35, 88. See also, at 93:  
There are three main problems with the database right: the absence of a strong link be-
tween the provisions as expressed and the justification for the protection, the protections 
as expressed are themselves overly-broad, and, there is uncertainty as to the level of in-
vestment required to attract or maintain database right. 
 204 Gervais, above n 8, 1111. 
 205 See, eg, Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou AE (C-
444/02) [2004] ECR I-10590; Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Svenska Spel AB (C-338/02) [2004] 
ECR I-10532; British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Organization Ltd (C-203/02) 
[2004] ECR I-10461; Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus Ab (C-46/02) [2004] ECR I-
10396. 
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the database.206 This differs significantly from protection of subject matter 
under Part IV, which protects the mere fact of creation of CGM, not the de-
gree of investment in the generated material, nor its procurement, presenta-
tion or verification. Neither does it differentiate between CGM which could 
meet the definition of ‘database’ in the European Database Directive, and oth-
er CGM. The European Database Directive protects conduct in relation to 
existing material,207 whereas both Options 1 and 2 protect the creation of the 
material itself. 
1 Substantial Investment  
The primary argument for conferring copyright protection on unoriginal 
computer-generated output is that it is expensive and laborious to compile,208 
and protection is necessary to facilitate recovery of those expenses and pre-
vent free-riding. Conversely, copying the computer-generated output may be 
cheap and simple, particularly with the aid of software. The copier has not 
expended the labour, time or expense of the original compiler and can thus 
undercut the compiler on price. The difficulty with compilations of facts is 
striking the correct balance between protecting the investment of a legitimate 
original compiler and avoiding over-protection of low investment which 
would exclude legitimate users. As with all intellectual property balances, Par-
liament must seek to provide only the level of protection that is required to 
protect investment and encourage the creation of the computer-generated 
material, and no more. 
The primary shortcoming of Option 2 is that it will protect unoriginal 
CGM with minimal investment. Therefore, the European Database Directive’s 
condition of substantial investment required for database protection would be 
an important control on the potential over-protection of unoriginal CGM, 
and for that reason it was a proposed safeguard for Option 2. ‘Substantial in-
vestment’ is, of course, a relatively ambiguous and potentially very broad 
term,209 however it is preferable to have an indistinct control on over-
protection, than no control at all. As discussed above, the shortcomings of this 
 
 206 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
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safeguard are that not all CGM will result from substantial investment, and 
the safeguard is only required with respect to unoriginal CGM whose protec-
tion is only justified due to that substantial investment. 
2 Obtaining, Verifying or Presenting the Contents  
The developing jurisprudence on the European Database Directive210 suggests 
that its protective reach will not be as extensive as feared,211 and will not nec-
essarily cure the lacuna exposed by IceTV212 and Phone Directories.213 Case 
law interpreting the European Database Directive has clarified that it does not 
protect data which is created as a by-product of other commercial activities.214 
This is not ‘obtaining’ data. This in fact aligns with IceTV in respect of copy-
right works, which disregards skill and effort not sufficiently directed to the 
material expression of the copyright work,215 meaning that material which is 
created as an incident of other business endeavours is unprotected.216 Hence, 
sui generis legislation modelled on the European Database Directive, if judi-
cially interpreted in the same manner, will not protect the generation of the 
CGM. Therefore, if the objective of protection is to reward the creator for the 
fact of creation, Option 2 (with appropriate safeguards) would be preferable to 
an enthusiastic adoption of the European Database Directive. 
B  Who Makes and Owns CGM? 
The European Database Directive defines the ‘maker’ of the database as ‘the 
person who takes the initiative and the risk of investing’.217 In referring ex-
pressly and exclusively to the criterion of investment, rather than the broader 
concept of ‘arrangements’, this is narrower than the deemed maker of CGM in 
Option 2. However, if a subsistence criterion of substantial investment is em-
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 214 See, eg, British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Organization Ltd (C-203/02) [2004] ECR 
I-10461, I-10490 [80], cited in Davison, above n 6, 465. For further discussion of this case, 
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ployed, either in Option 2 or Option 3, it follows that the investor should be 
considered the maker. The phrase reflects the limited objectives of the Euro-
pean Database Directive, which rewards investment in obtaining, verifying, or 
presenting data. The maker of CGM, on the other hand, may not have ‘invest-
ed’, and the CGM may not be limited to data. This reinforces the difficulty in 
attempting to craft workable protection for all CGM, and demonstrates that 
otherwise original CGM should be separately protected pursuant to Option 1. 
C  Exclusive Rights 
The database owner has the exclusive right to prevent extraction and/or re-
utilisation of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively, of the contents of the database.218 Infringement also occurs  
by the  
repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of insubstantial parts 
of the contents of the database implying acts which conflict with a normal ex-
ploitation of that database or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate in-
terests of the maker.219 
Extraction refers to ‘the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substan-
tial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in 
any form’.220 This can be compared to the reproduction right in respect of 
works, and the right to copy in respect of other subject matter. The concept of 
‘transfer’ may however be narrower than the notions of reproduction or mak-
ing a copy. Transferring implies some process of transmitting the data from 
one point to another, and it may be a temporary transmission, whereas a re-
production of a copyright work can occur from memory and without any 
process of ‘transfer’. The making of a copy differs from transferring, because it 
is necessarily a permanent copy. 
Reutilisation is defined as ‘any form of making available to the public all or 
a substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by 
renting, by on-line or other forms of transmission.’221 This is an omnibus term 
which mirrors the rental right conferred in Part III of the Act,222 and the right 
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of communication to the public conferred in Parts III and IV of the Act.223 
The reference to the ‘distribution of copies’ most closely mirrors the publica-
tion right224 in respect of works. 
The ‘repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of insubstan-
tial parts of the contents of the database’ is only prohibited if those acts con-
flict with a normal exploitation of that database or unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the maker. Ostensibly, this imports the three-step test 
from the Berne Convention,225 with the result that infringement is dependent 
on the effects of the infringer’s conduct. This is clearly a very different ap-
proach to the existing infringement provisions in the Act, where infringement 
occurs when the requisite act has been done, irrespective of its effects.226 Fur-
ther, IceTV clarifies that incremental, insubstantial reproductions cannot cu-
mulatively amount to a single substantial reproduction.227 In any event, this 
provision has been narrowly interpreted by the European Court of Justice. It is 
intended to prevent the ‘reconstitution of the database as a whole or, at the 
very least, of a substantial part of it’.228  
D  Duration 
The database right endures initially for 15 years. However, the term may  
be extended where a new substantial investment results in a ‘substantial  
change … to the contents’.229 There is clearly a significant difference in the 
duration of protection under the European Database Directive, when com-
pared to the Act. However, the permanently renewable nature of a database 
may have some similarity with CGM, particularly where the CGM is a fluid 
repository of data. Another difference is in the nature of ‘change’ reflected in 
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the European Database Directive. It has been argued that investing in a thor-
ough verification of the contents of a database may be a sufficiently substantial 
‘change’ to trigger a new term of protection.230 This may not, however, result 
in a material change to the form of the database, which would be required to 
effectively trigger the protection of new CGM under the Act. 
E  Exceptions 
There are three major exceptions to the database right: 
a) in the case of extraction for private purposes of the contents of a non-
electronic database; 
b) in the case of extraction for the purposes of illustration for teaching or 
scientific research, as long as the source is indicated and to the extent jus-
tified by the non-commercial purpose to be achieved; and 
c) in the case of extraction and/or re-utilisation for the purposes of public 
security or an administrative or judicial procedure.231 
The European Database Directive also clarifies that database users may ex-
tract and/or reutilise insubstantial parts of its contents (measured qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively) for any purposes whatsoever, provided the user does 
not ‘perform acts which conflict with normal exploitation of the database or 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the data-
base’.232 Again, this reflects the Berne Convention three-step test, and it is quite 
a different approach to copyright infringement, where exercising an exclusive 
right of the copyright owner in respect of an insubstantial part of the work or 
subject matter will never amount to infringement, and where infringement  
is only tested against the bare criteria of the three-step test in s 200AB of  
the Act.233 
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The limited nature of the exceptions has been widely criticised,234 and 
clearly broader exceptions would be required to address the problems caused 
by the range of CGM, including those discussed in relation to Option 2 above. 
F  Overlap 
The potential for overlap between the Act and any sui generis legislation 
would require careful consideration. However, that risk is limited if Option 1 
is not pursued. Unless an authorial deeming provision is included in Part III, 
‘otherwise original’ CGM will never be a ‘work’. Thus, the only prospect of 
protection is under Option 2 or sui generis legislation. If Option 1 is pursued 
in addition to Option 2 or sui generis legislation, there is a risk that otherwise 
original CGM may be protected in both Part III and under sui generis legisla-
tion. This could be cured by a provision expressly limiting protection of dual-
qualifying CGM to Part III. 
G  Constitutionality 
There is some debate as to whether sui generis protection for databases would 
be constitutionally permissible under the Constitution.235 The same concerns 
could apply to CGM. However, circuit layouts have been protected (without 
controversy) as a discrete form of intellectual property,236 despite any specific 
mention of the technology in the Constitution, based on an expansive inter-
pretation of the legislative power in s 51(xviii) of the Constitution extending to 
‘products of intellectual effort’.237 Whether unoriginal CGM involves sufficient 
‘intellectual effort’ is, of course, controversial and an alternative source of con-
stitutional power may need to be identified.238 
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H  A Registration System? 
A number of concerns have been outlined in relation to both Option 2 and sui 
generis protection. Those concerns necessitate the exploration of numerous 
safeguards, including those utilised in the European Database Directive. The 
safeguards themselves raise many questions, amplified by the difficulty of 
adapting safeguards to accommodate the breadth of CGM and address all 
anticipated problems. The safeguards are in part designed to prevent automat-
ic protection of CGM which could be unduly generous and overly costly. This 
can result in an excessively blunt approach which is too prescriptive in respect 
of some CGM, and too liberal in respect of other CGM. 
These problems could suggest that sui generis legislation based on a regis-
tration system similar to the patent and trademark system is worth consider-
ing. The potential adverse consequences of automatically protecting socially 
costly CGM are at least as problematic as conferring patent rights on an unde-
serving invention.239 Therefore, protection following an evaluative assessment 
may be the most prudent course of action. The evaluative criteria could  
include: 
a) the cost of creating the CGM (the substantial investment criterion); 
b) the risk of unauthorised appropriation of the CGM; 
c) the social and economic costs of conferring protection; 
d) the proposed cost to users of accessing and using the CGM;  
e) the utility of the CGM; and 
f) whether the CGM may be obtained from other sources, and the ease of 
doing so. 
This system could be supplemented with an appropriate range of excep-
tions as discussed in relation to Option 2, including a compulsory licence 
scheme. The chief disadvantage of this system is, of course, the bureaucratic 
cost of administering it and the time lag in obtaining certainty of protection 
while the application proceeds. However, it has the advantages of transparen-
cy and enhanced certainty (even if the registered right may be judicially re-
viewed) enjoyed by the existing registration systems. 
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I  Conclusions — Option 3 
Sui generis protection for original CGM is superfluous, given that Option 1 
affords an appropriate method of protection. Sui generis protection for uno-
riginal CGM may be justifiable if the concerns with respect to Option 2 neces-
sitate bespoke legislation. Mere adoption of the European Database Directive 
model will not cure all of the problems identified in this article and in Part 1. 
Any sui generis regime must be crafted with the deficiencies and limitations of 
the European Database Directive, and the issues outlined with respect to Op-
tion 2, in mind. 
VI  C O N C LU SI O N  
Part 1 addressed the arguments for protecting CGM which, but for the lack of 
human authorship, would have been protected as a copyright work under the 
Act. Being ‘otherwise original works’, these creations meet all copyright sub-
sistence criteria other than authorship. Originality does not necessarily elimi-
nate the potentially adverse effects of copyright protection, however, it tends 
to minimise them. To the extent that copyright protection for otherwise orig-
inal CGM may have adverse effects, this applies to all works. Protection of 
such ‘nearly copyright’ works is best achieved under Option 1, since it cures 
the central defect — it supplies an author where one is missing. While there 
may be issues of interpretation of the reform provisions, there are no major 
obstacles to this reform option. Further, other jurisdictions have effectuated 
this reform model with no apparent adverse outcomes. The growing jurispru-
dence on the interpretation of substantially identical provisions in neighbour-
ing common law jurisdictions can be usefully monitored. There is also useful 
judicial interpretation of similar statutory wording in the context of film and 
sound recording authorship. 
Part 1 did not engage comprehensively with the policy and other issues 
that surround protection for unoriginal CGM. Options 2 and 3 extend protec-
tion beyond the ‘otherwise original material’ examined in Part 1, to unoriginal 
material which may, or may not, merit protection. As such, they raise a pleth-
ora of issues which require further, and more careful, deliberation. However, 
that should not prevent early protection of the otherwise original authorless 
works examined in Part 1. Indeed, there are compelling arguments for sepa-
rately protecting merely authorless works in Part III of the Act, and authorless 
and unoriginal works through some other mechanism — just as original and 
unoriginal material is currently divided between Parts III and IV of the Act. 
